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1 Introduction
According to South African law, all contracts are subject to the requirement 
of good faith.1 The implications of this position are not entirely clear, but it at 
least means the following. Firstly, good faith is an underlying value of the law 
of contract, which is reflected in its established rules,2 and which could also be 
resorted to in justifying the development of new rules. Secondly, courts may 
take into account good faith when deciding whether to read an implied term 
into a contract,3 or when interpreting a contract.4 Thirdly, good faith is not a 
“self-standing rule”5 or “free-floating” basis for courts to exercise a general 
equitable discretion to refuse enforcing contracts.6
It has often been argued that the current position is unsatisfactory, and that 
promoting greater fairness in the South African law of contract requires more 
prominence to be accorded to good faith than the limited role set out above. 
In support of this argument some have pointed out that the private law codes 
of modern civil-law systems generally contain provisions to the effect that 
* The financial support of the National Research Foundation is acknowledged with gratitude. The research 
was partly conducted when I was a visiting researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and 
International Private Law in Hamburg; a word of appreciation goes to Reinhard Zimmermann for being 
such a generous host and for Jan Peter Schmidt for his valuable comments. I further benefitted greatly 
from discussions with my colleagues Gerhard Lubbe and Franziska Myburgh, and from the comments 
of the anonymous referees. This article is dedicated to the memory of Hennie Erasmus, who had a deep 
understanding of the processes whereby our common law could constantly be renewed – also in the 
context of good faith in the law of contract (see HJ Erasmus “Roman law in South Africa Today” (1989) 
106 SALJ 666 676-677).
1 See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 80; South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers 
Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) para 32. Sometimes it is said that all contracts are bonae fidei or subject to 
good faith (see Meskin NO v Anglo-American Corporation of SA Ltd 1968 4 SA 793 (W) 802 or that 
parties must relate to each other in good faith (see Kwa-Zulu Natal Joint Liaison Committee v MEC for 
Education, Kwazulu-Natal 2013 4 SA 262 (CC) para 17; further see Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v De 
Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 601F-G). 
2 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 82. 
3 
Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 70-71; R Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in R 
Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross - Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 217 
244-245; see the text to part 4 3 below.
4 
South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) para 32; Meskin NO v Anglo-
American Corporation of SA Ltd 1968 4 SA 793 (W) 802; Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in 
Southern Cross 242-243; see the text to part 2 2 1 below.
5 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 82.
6 
Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 22, relying on an influential essay by D Hutchison “Non-
variation Clauses in Contract: Any Escape from the Shifren Straightjacket?” (2001) 118 SALJ 720 
743-744; F Brand “The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of Contract: A 
further Instalment” (2016) 27 Stell LR 238.
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parties must act according to good faith.7 In other words, in these codes, 
good faith is not (only) a value underlying the law of contract; it is given effect 
to by a general rule that courts may rely on directly to provide relief. 
The purpose here is to explore whether foreign experiences suggest that 
South African law should indeed elevate the status of good faith from that 
of an underlying value to such a rule or standard. It would be an impossible 
task to consider all the codified good faith clauses in national laws8 and in 
international instruments.9 The focus consequently will be on arguably the 
most prominent and far-reaching of these clauses, namely paragraph 242 of 
the German Civil Code or Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (“§ 242 BGB” or simply 
“the good faith clause”). 10 It reads as follows:
The debtor must perform in the manner required by good faith, taking into account common usage 
(Der Schuldner ist verpflichtet, die Leistung so zu bewirken, wie Treu und Glauben mit Rücksicht auf 
die Verkehrssitte es erfordern). 
One hastens to add that even though the wording of the good faith clause 
suggests that it only applies to how an obligation, and more specifically a 
contractual obligation is to be performed, the provision is generally, and quite 
generously, interpreted to mean that rights have to be exercised and duties 
have to be fulfilled according to good faith. The ambit of the clause is therefore 
not limited to the manner of performance of a contract; in fact, it extends even 
beyond the domain of the law of contract, or private law in general. 
German law has grappled for more than a century with delineating the 
contours of this provision. These experiences have also enjoyed the attention 
of South African courts, most notably the seminal judgment of Jansen JA in 
7 See eg L Hawthorne “Abuse of a Right to Dismiss not Contrary to Good Faith” (2005) 17 SA Merc LJ 
214 217-219; A Louw “Yet Another Call for a Greater Role for Good Faith in the South African Law of 
Contract: Can We Banish the Law of the Jungle, while Avoiding the Elephant in the Room?” (2013) PELJ 
68 81 sqq; South African Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification 
of Contracts Project 47 Report (1998) 140 (setting out the submissions of Van der Merwe and Van 
Huyssteen). The application of good faith in continental European codes is virtually absent as a topic 
in pre-1980 academic literature; this could be ascribed in part to local sympathy for the Pandectist (pre-
codification) approach in German law, which did not favour such an open-ended norm. On this approach 
see P du Plessis “Good Faith and Equity in the Law of Contract in the Civilian Tradition” (2002) 65 
THRHR 397 406-407, 409. For an early indication of the value of comparative perspectives in this context, 
see G Lubbe “Bona Fides, Billikheid en die Openbare Belang in die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg” 
(1990) 1 Stell LR 1 19 n 97.
8 For comparative overviews see eg S Whittaker & R Zimmermann (eds) Good Faith in European 
Contract Law (2000); H Beale et al Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law 2 ed (2010) 775-779, 
812-826; D Looschelders, D Olzen & G Schiemann (eds) J von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, Buch 2, Recht der Schuldverhältnisse Einleitung 
zum Schuldrecht §§ 241 - 243 (Treu und Glauben) § 242 by D Looschelders, D Olzen (2015) paras 1160-
1254; S Cornelius “Bepaalde Verskyningsvorme van Goeie Trou in die Kontraktereg” (2001) TSAR 241 
245-248.
9 See eg S Vogenauer “Art 1.7” in S Vogenauer (ed) Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 2 ed (2015) 205-225. On the application of Art 7(1) of the 
CISG see P Schlechtriem “Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws” (February 
1997) https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem16.html (accessed 9-10-2018).
10 For overviews in English see S Whittaker & R Zimmermann “Good faith in European Contract Law: 
Surveying the Legal Landscape” in Whittaker & Zimmermann (eds) Good Faith 718-32; W F Ebke & 
B M Steinhauer “The Doctrine of Good Faith in German Contract Law” in J Beatson & D Friedmann 
(eds) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995) 171. For a broader comparative view of the treatment 
of good faith in international instruments see J P Schmidt “Art 1:201: Good Faith and Fair Dealing” in 
N Jansen & R Zimmermann (eds) Commentaries on European Contract Laws (2018) 101-156.
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Tuckers Land & Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis,
11 which based 
an implied duty not to commit anticipatory breach on the requirement that 
contracts are subject to good faith.
Crucially, the German Civil Code was built on the foundations of uncodified 
rules of civil law that also underlie much of our law of contract. From a South 
African perspective it may therefore be of particular interest to establish to 
what extent these experiences indicate that adopting a good faith rule can 
promote greater fairness, or whether they rather point in the opposite direction 
and caution us against according good faith a more prominent role than that 
of an underlying value. 
In these deliberations it will of course have to be borne in mind that 
German law and South African law do not necessarily share identical values, 
policies or goals;12 different social, political, economic and cultural conditions 
may require different means of giving expression to good faith. This could 
also influence the determination of the standard of behaviour expected from 
contracting parties. Nonetheless, in these two systems there at least appears to 
be strong coherence at the level of the recognition of fundamental rights and 
constitutional values. 
With these introductory observations in mind, let us then first try to obtain 
a better grasp on the good faith clause itself.
2 The good faith clause in the German Civil Code
2 1 The background to and general meaning of the good faith clause
2 1 1 The meaning of good faith
As is often the case with a code, much is concealed behind the wording. 
Firstly, when applying § 242 BGB, “good faith” does not simply mean fairness 
or reasonableness. It bears a more specific meaning, which sometimes is 
explained by closer examination of the German term, Treu und Glauben, of 
which “good faith” is a rather vague translation. The term essentially requires 
that a party takes into account the protectable interests of another party (that 
is, displays Treu) and the other party in turn must rely on this (that is, must 
display Glauben).13 The protection of this reliance lies at the heart of the 
whole construct of good faith. When used in this sense, the concept is defined 
“objectively” as a standard of behaviour, as opposed to the “subjective” sense 
of having the state of mind of being “in good faith”, typically through not 
knowing something. German law then uses a different term, guter Glaube, to 
describe “subjective” good faith.
11 1980 1 SA 645 (A) 652D, commented on by DL Carey Miller “Iudicia Bonae Fidei: A New Development 
in Contract?” 1980 (87) SALJ 531; further see the references in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 31; Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) para 104.
12 See Schlechtriem “Good Faith in German Law” 17-18.
13 See Staudinger § 242 para 140-143; Jauernig - Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch Kommentar 16 ed (2015) § 242 by 
H-P Mansel para 3. However, as we have seen, in applying the good faith clause, German lawyers hardly 
limit themselves to its exact wording; and we are also acting somewhat a-historically when parsing a 
German expression to give effect to a concept that is essentially Roman in origin (i.e. bona fides). 
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2 1 2 The constitutional dimension
Secondly, in German law the value system embodied in the Constitution 
decisively influences the application of the good faith clause.14 This application 
may require carefully balancing rights or interests. Thus, while parties should 
be free to give expression to their autonomy by determining the content of 
their contract,15 they may not engage in discriminatory practices. The good 
faith clause has been invoked, for example, to prevent a party from terminating 
a contract because it finds the other party’s sexual preferences objectionable.16 
As an open-ended norm, the good faith clause carries with it the risks, 
as Wieacker put it, of judges being exposed to political and ideological 
pressures and deciding cases “on purely equitable grounds with no underlying 
principle”.17 This has sadly been the case in the past, when the clause was 
resorted to in order to justify interfering with contractual relations for deeply 
sinister political motives.18 For example, in order to give practical effect to 
the racial-political views of National Socialism, German courts relied on the 
good faith clause to justify allowing non-Jewish employers to terminate the 
apprenticeships of Jewish employees.19
These experiences are potentially relevant in the South African context. 
At the heart of our constitutional state is a horizontally-applicable Bill of 
Rights, which provides the broader context in which expression must be given 
to good faith in our legal system. As we have seen, good faith at present is 
(only) regarded as a constitutional value that underlies the law of contract. 
However, German experiences suggest that if it ever were to assume a more 
prominent position, this constitutional context would be of crucial importance 
to delineate its contours. This context should not only prevent courts from 
invoking good faith to justify the extreme ideologically-motivated type of 
decisions referred to above, but also constrain them from falling in the trap, 
warned against by Wieacker, of assuming broad equitable powers that exceed 
their constitutional mandate. 
2 1 3 Good faith as general norm, not limited to the law of contract
Thirdly, the good faith clause is a general provision of the civil code and 
is not only applicable to the law of contract. Nonetheless, in the contractual 
context it is especially relevant; here the “special relationship” or special 
connection (Sonderverbinding) between the parties that is required to rely on 
the provision clearly is present. Furthermore, this connection does not only 
14 
Palandt - Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 76 ed (2017) § 242 by C Grüneberg para 8; Jauernig § 242 para 3; 
further see Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) para 104.
15 See Münchener Kommentar – Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, Schuldrecht Allgemeiner Teil 7 ed (2016) § 242 
by C Schubert para 69; Jauernig § 242 para 3.
16 See Münchener Kommentar § 242 para 69. These issues are now governed by legislation.
17 F Wieacker A History of Private Law in Europe transl T Weir (1995) 377; F Wieacker Zur 
rechtstheoretischen Präzisierung des § 242 BGB (1956) 9.
18 RAG DR 1939, 2041. See Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB Band II Schuldrecht: Allgemeiner 
Teil 1. Teilband (2013) §§ 241-304 by T Duve & H-P Haferkamp paras 23-24, 71-76; Staudinger § 242 para 
77; U Spellenberg “Individualism and the Balancing of Interests in German Civil Law” in F Diedrich (ed) 
Ubuntu, Good Faith and Equity (2011) 148-151.
19 RAG DR 1939, 2041.
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arise when they are contractually bound, but could exist when they commenced 
negotiations, or when they are involved in invalid legal transactions. 
2 1 4 Good faith and equity
Finally, commentaries make it abundantly clear that the good faith clause 
does not provide judges with a general equitable discretion to decide cases 
according to subjective notions of fairness. Its application rather requires a 
careful weighing up of relevant interests,20 which enables specific new legal 
instruments to be developed.21 It has been said that this provision is more 
appropriately regarded as a “pressure valve”, which provides relief when 
other means are insufficient.22 The care which the courts exercise in applying 
the provision, and the degree of precision required when relying on it, is 
neatly summarised by the following reaction of Professor Kötz to English 
commentators who expressed grave reservations about a good faith standard:
Most cases [involving the application of § 242 BGB] can be assigned to one of a number of well-
defined rules which have all been developed by the courts under the umbrella of § 242 BGB, but 
which now lead a separate and independent existence so that figuratively speaking, the statutory 
foundation of § 242 BGB could be withdrawn without any risk of having the judge-made edifice 
collapse. It would be a poor advocate who would simply cite § 242 BGB to the judge to invite him to 
dispense justice to his client according to the principles of good faith and fair dealing. What would be 
expected of him would be references to the more specific doctrines of say … frustration, or forfeiture, 
including the judgements applying these doctrines to individual cases.23
Ultimately, therefore, the devil is in the detail: the good faith clause works 
because specific rules give effect to it. Those rules were hammered out on the 
anvil of concrete cases and incremental scholarly analysis. We will turn to 
these rules presently, but before doing so, we first need a better understanding 
of the broader context in which the general clause operates.
2 2  The relationship between the good faith clause and other provisions 
of the German Civil Code
The domain of a good faith clause can vary substantially, depending on 
other provisions in the code that could supplement it or give more concrete 
expression to its demands. These domains can also change over time. German 
law relatively recently relocated some established applications of the good 
faith clause, for example on situations involving change of circumstances, 
into separate provisions of the code.24 South African observers seeking 
guidance on the potential role of good faith in our law have to be sensitive to 
this broader context. It is not sufficient merely to take a comparative snapshot 
of what the good faith clause currently does; it is also necessary to know what 
20 BGH 49, 153; BGH 135, 337, see Jauernig § 242 paras 4, 9. On weighing up interests see esp Münchener 
Kommentar § 242 paras 50-81.
21 
Jauernig § 242 para 9. 
22 
Historisch-kritischer Kommentar § 242 para 88.
23 H Kötz “Towards a European Civil Code: The Duty of Good Faith” in P Cane & J Stapleton (eds) The Law 
of Obligations - Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (1998) 243 250. 
24 See 6 2 below; A Hutchison “Gap Filling to Address Changed Circumstances in Contract Law – When it 
Comes to Losses and Gains, Sharing is the Fair Solution” (2010) 3 Stell LR 414 415.
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the clause does not do, and why this is so. Let us then consider in more detail 
other provisions in the German Civil Code that define this clause’s external 
boundaries. The choice of provisions is at best a selection of some prominent 
examples, since ultimately the domain of the good faith clause is influenced 
by the code as a whole.
2 2 1  Rules on interpretation 
According to § 157 BGB, contracts are to be interpreted according to the 
requirements of good faith, taking into account common usage. The wording 
of this provision closely resembles that of the good faith clause, and in practice 
the boundaries between them can at times be indistinct.25 This is because the 
good faith clause (as we will presently see) can be relied on to supplement 
contractual terms.26 It can be a matter of some complexity, however, to 
establish whether a party is under a particular contractual duty based on the 
proper interpretation of a contract (according to § 157 BGB), or because a 
term to this effect may be read into the contract (according to the good faith 
clause).
This distinction should not be entirely surprising to South African lawyers, 
for our law of contract recognises a rule of interpretation comparable to § 157 
BGB. Thus, in South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd, Brand JA 
held that: 
“In the interpretation process, the notions of fairness and good faith that underlie the law of contract 
again have a role to play. While a court is not entitled to superimpose on the clearly expressed 
intention of the parties its notion of fairness, the position is different when a contract is ambiguous. In 
such a case, the principle that all contracts are governed by good faith is applied and the intention of 
the parties is determined on the basis that they negotiated with one another in good faith.”27 
The extent to which ambiguity may still be required when interpreting in 
this manner, and whether the purpose of interpretation indeed is to determine 
the intention of the parties may nowadays be disputed, but the underlying idea 
is clear: when giving meaning to a clause, courts may favour an interpretation 
that promotes good faith. Thus, a less onerous, commercially more efficacious 
or fair interpretation would be regarded as closer to the intention of the 
parties.28 And where a clause grants a party a discretion to evaluate another 
party’s conduct or performance, such an interpretation could require that 
the discretion be exercised reasonably.29 However, as in German law, it is 
at times not quite apparent whether the exercise is one of interpretation, or 
 
25 Whittaker & Zimmermann “Good faith in European Contract Law” in Good Faith 18-19, 29.
26 See 4 below. Book 2 Title 1 of the German civil code contains a host of provisions on the duty of 
performance; these provisions inter alia relate to payment of monetary obligations, payment of interest, 
duties to render accounts, part performance, performance by third parties, the place of performance, and 
the time of performance.
27 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) para 32.
28 
Mittermeier v Skema Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1984 1 SA 121 (A) 128.
29 See Dharumpal Transport (Pty) Ltd v Dharumpal 1956 1 SA 700 (A) 706-707; Joosub Investments (Pty) 
Ltd v Maritime & General Insurance Co Ltd 1990 3 SA 373 (C) 383E (relied on in South African Forestry 
Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) para 32); and part 5 2 1 2 (b) below.
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simply reading in a term or applying a general rule of law, for example on how 
discretions must be exercised.
2 2 2  Rules on prohibiting abuse of rights or harassment
The next provision in the German Civil Code that must be distinguished 
from the good faith clause deals with “abuse of rights” or, as it is less often 
called, harassment. According to § 226 BGB, a right may not be exercised if its 
only possible purpose consists in causing another person damage.30 A classic 
example is building in front of a neighbouring property merely to obstruct the 
neighbour’s view. In practice, the provision is not of great relevance. As will 
be indicated later, less extreme forms of abusive conduct could in any event 
be covered by the good faith clause. This means that parties would be more 
inclined to rely on that provision, which is an easier hurdle to cross than § 226 
BGB.31 
The doctrine of abuse of rights is also recognised in South African law, 
where (like § 226 BGB) it leads a rather marginal existence. It consists of 
a similarly strict set of requirements for branding the purpose of exercising 
of a right as improper.32 The aggrieved party must not only prove that the 
other party had the “sole or predominant intention to harm” (the subjective 
requirement), but also that the action “served no appreciable or legitimate 
interest” of the other party (the objective requirement).33
The question remains whether there are situations in South African law 
where a party is unable to meet the strict requirements of the doctrine of abuse 
of rights, but should still be able to prevent another from exercising rights in a 
manner that prejudices his interests. To this issue we will return later.34
2 2 3  Rules on fraud and duress as improper means of obtaining 
consent 
Our third category of rules located beyond the ambit of the German good 
faith clause deals with various improper ways of obtaining consent. In line 
with established practice in the civilian tradition, the German Civil Code 
provides in § 123 BGB that a party may rescind a contract which has been 
concluded due to another’s intentional misrepresentation or fraud (which 
could take the form of failing to disclose information), or due to another’s 
30 The Schikaneverbot (see Staudinger § 242 para 373-375; Münchener Kommentar § 242 para 134).
31 See 5 2 below; Whittaker & Zimmermann “Good faith in European Contract Law” in Good Faith 20 n 67. 
32 See J E Scholtens “Abuse of Rights” (1958) 75 SALJ 39 48 n 56; J Neels “Tussen Regmatigheid en 
Onregmatigheid: Die Leerstuk van Oorskryding van Regte en Bevoegdhede” (Deel 1) (1999) TSAR 639; 
(Deel 2) (2000) TSAR 317; (Deel 3) (2000) TSAR 469; (Deel 4) (2000) TSAR 643.
33 
Koukoudis v Abrina 1772 (Pty) Ltd 2016 5 SA 352 (SCA) paras 25, 31. In early case law, concern was 
expressed that abuse of rights cannot be a ground for relief, due to the problem of proof of a party’s 
motive (for the Bible says that even “the heart of Kings is unsearchable”), but these problems were clearly 
not regarded as insurmountable. See Scholtens (1958) 75 SALJ 39 46-47. Further see J Neethling & J 
Potgieter “Vonnisbespreking: Bemoeiing met ’n Uitsluitende Kontraktuele Verhouding Getroef deur 
Vrye Mededinging” LitNet Akademies 14(1) (23-3-2017).
34 See the text to part 5 2 below.
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unlawful threats. 35 No need exists to resort to the good faith clause to combat 
these improper ways of obtaining consent.
None of this should be unfamiliar in the South African context. Our law 
also recognises that a contract could be invalid as a consequence of fraud or 
duress, albeit that in the case of fraud it adopts a slightly different perspective. 
We start by asking whether there was a misrepresentation (whether made 
fraudulently, negligently, or innocently) and what type of mistake it induced. 
If the misrepresentation only induced a non-material mistake (in essence one 
relating merely to the motive behind concluding the contract), the contract is 
voidable. Fraud is just one type of misrepresentation that could induce such a 
mistake. And if the misrepresentation induces a material mistake which is also 
reasonable (that is, a iustus error), the contract is void. The fact that a material 
mistake was caused by a misrepresentation (whether made fraudulently or 
not), would provide a strong indication that the mistake is reasonable. So 
ultimately the focus is on the effect of various misrepresentations on consent, 
and fraud itself enjoys less prominence.36
But what do all these rather daunting rules on misrepresentation inducing 
mistake have to do with good faith? Our courts clearly do not, in addition to 
these rules, rely on a good faith rule or principle to provide relief in cases of 
improperly obtained consent.37 However, this does not mean that good faith 
is irrelevant to the application of these rules. Thus, in determining when a 
party’s failure to speak constitutes an actionable misrepresentation, it can be 
argued that courts could be guided by the underlying value of good faith, 
which requires concern for a contracting party’s dignity and expectations in 
concluding the contract, especially where there are no alternative means of 
obtaining information vital to the conclusion of the contract. 
2 2 4 Rules on wrongful conduct in the course of negotiations 
We now move from specific defects of consent to standards of behaviour in 
the process of negotiation. In this regard German law imposes duties on parties 
engaging in negotiations to observe a certain degree of concern for each other’s 
positions, more specifically when withdrawing from negotiations would cause 
another party harm. Historically, this is the domain of the doctrine of culpa 
in contrahendo, which initially was uncodified, but now is contained in § 311 
35 Relief could further be provided under §§ 434 sq BGB to purchasers of defective goods.
36 L van Huyssteen, GF Lubbe & MFB Reinecke Contract General Principles 5 ed (2016) 25-30, 43-44, 98.
37 The same goes for situations where a party seeking to enforce a contract argues that the other party 
created a reasonable reliance of assenting to the contract. As Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd (formerly 
known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v Pappadogianis 1992 3 SA 234 (A) indicates, it would not be bona 
fide to “snap up” a bargain, knowing that the other party possibly mistakenly created the impression. 
But merely enquiring whether there was such an intention suggests an application of a general good faith 
norm or principle. The courts are applying established rules relating to liability imposed on objective 
grounds.
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II BGB. Its formulation is rather intractable,38 but it essentially provides that 
when parties commence negotiations, a special relationship of trust is created, 
which requires of them to take account of each other’s rights and interests. 
The failure to honour this duty could give rise to liability to pay damages, 
unless the party in breach is not responsible for the failure. Liability under this 
provision is not based on any pre-contractual contract or agreement which 
the parties may (in any event) conclude to govern their relationship during 
negotiations. This liability could be regarded as being rooted in good faith, 
which requires parties to consider each other’s interests.39 
There is no direct South African counterpart to § 311 II BGB. The general 
position in our law is that parties must enjoy considerable freedom to withdraw 
from negotiations. There are only limited indications that delictual liability for 
damages could arise from misleading a party in the course of negotiations,40 
or that a party who is enriched due to the breaking off of negotiations may 
(theoretically at least) be obliged to disgorge benefits on the basis of unjustified 
enrichment.41 One of the major challenges facing our law of contract is to 
determine whether it should require that parties display greater concern for 
each other’s interests when negotiating a contract. In this regard the German 
experiences suggest that specific rules imposing such duties can indeed be 
justified on the basis that they give expression to good faith as underlying 
value.
2 2 5 Rules on legality: violating statute and public policy
We now turn to one of the most complex and important areas of interaction 
between the good faith clause and other provisions of the German Civil Code. 
German law adopts the point of departure that it respects parties’ autonomous 
decisions concerning with whom and on what terms they wish to contract. 
However, this general statement is qualified by two important sets of rules. 
The first set regulates the legality of the substance or content of contractual 
terms, and the second regulates the way in which valid terms or rights may be 
exercised or enforced.
As far as the first set is concerned, no legal system accepts that parties have 
complete freedom to determine the contents of a contract. In this regard § 134 
BGB determines that a legal transaction that violates a statutory prohibition is 
void, unless the statute leads to a different conclusion, whereas § 138 (1) BGB 
states that a legal transaction which is contrary to public policy is void. As far 
as the second set is concerned, the good faith clause limits the way in which 
38 According to § 311 BGB, duties under § 241(2) BGB to take account of the rights, legal interests and other 
interests of the other party, could arise from 
(1) commencing negotiations; 
(2) initiating a contract where one party, with regard to a potential contractual relationship, gives the 
other party the possibility of affecting his rights, legal interests and other interests, or entrusts these 
to him; or 
(3) similar business contacts.
39 See Van Huyssteen et al Contract 85.
40 87. 
41 On the possibilities see A Hutchison “Liability for Breaking Off Contractual Negotiations?” (2012) 129 
SALJ 104.
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a valid right may be enforced or exercised. The boundaries between these 
two sets of provisions can be rather indistinct,42 but in general it is only if the 
“substantive validity” hurdle of the first set of rules (that is, §§ 134 and 138 (1) 
BGB) is crossed, that enforceability can be tested in terms of the second set 
(that is, the good faith clause). 
The division above is significant in the South African context. In Barkhuizen 
v Napier (“Barkhuizen”),43 the Constitutional Court had to decide whether 
a time limitation clause was valid and enforceable. The court applied the 
standard of public policy, which inter alia is influenced by considerations of 
fairness. It then held that two questions must be asked in determining fairness. 
The first is whether the clause itself is unreasonable. This is the question of 
substantive validity, which German law deals with under the first set of rules 
above. If the clause is invalid, the enquiry ends.44 
However, if the clause is not so unreasonable as to be contrary to public 
policy, and hence valid, the second question is asked, namely whether the 
term should be enforced in light of the circumstances.45 This is the enquiry 
under the second set of rules above, which in German law is the domain of the 
good faith clause. South African law does not recognise anything comparable 
to such a clause, but it is now well-established in cases like Barkhuizen46 
that courts may refuse enforcement of a valid term (that is, one that passed 
the first hurdle of substantive validity) if this would be contrary to public 
policy. The standard is therefore not that of good faith. Subsequently, in 
Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd (“Bredenkamp”),47 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (“SCA”) confirmed that courts may prevent enforcement of 
a right (or exercising a right – in casu the right of a bank to terminate the 
client’s mandate) in light of public policy, but made it clear that this power is 
not exercised based on general considerations of “fairness”; it was essential 
that “some or other public policy consideration found in the Constitution or 
elsewhere is implicated”.48 
This prompts the following question. When comparing the German and 
South African approaches, are there situations where enforcement of a valid 
42 See Staudinger § 242 paras 365-371; Whittaker & Zimmermann “Good Faith in European Contract Law” 
in Good Faith 29-30; Münchener Kommentar § 242 paras 131-133. 
43 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
44 Thus, in Neugebauer & Co Ltd v Hermann 1923 AD 564, the agreement between prospective bidders 
to collude to keep the price low was in itself substantively unreasonable and contrary to public policy. 
The parties’ motive was to deceive the seller, and they therefore subjectively acted in bad faith, but this 
does not mean that a good faith principle, in the sense of some general rule, was the basis for relief. The 
problem was one of illegality (see G Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7 ed (2016) 445).
45 See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 56, read with para 48.
46 In Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A), Jansen JA in a minority judgment 
suggested that public policy could not fulfil such a limiting function, and that the demise of the exceptio 
doli would leave a vacuum (616). But in his reaction to the case, Zimmermann prophetically envisaged 
an increased role of public policy after the demise of the exceptio doli (The Law of Obligations – Roman 
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1996) 677). This is exactly what happened when public policy 
came to be accepted as a standard against which enforcement can be tested (for recognition of this role 
prior to Barkhuizen see Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 31 and for a historical overview of the 
origins of the public policy rule see L Hawthorne “Public Policy: The Origin of a General Clause in the 
South African Law of Contract” (2013) 19 Fundamina 300).
47 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA).
48 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 50.
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term would violate the good faith clause of German law, yet not meet the 
South African test that a public policy consideration has to be “implicated” 
before enforcement can be refused? To this question we will return later when 
we consider the application of the good faith clause more closely.49 For the 
moment, it can be concluded that South African law, like German law, clearly 
recognises that courts may control the substance and enforcement of clauses, 
but that South African law, unlike German law, imposes both limitations with 
reference to the public policy standard.
2 2 6 Rules on exploitation of weakness
One final aspect of the rules surrounding the good faith clause requires 
consideration. It will be recalled that German law provides relief when fraud 
and duress are used to obtain consent.50 But these are not the only circumstances 
where a party whose consent to a contract has been obtained in an improper 
manner will be provided with relief. In this regard § 138(2) BGB specifically 
targets the exploitation of certain forms of weakness that result in a clear 
disproportion between the parties’ performances.51 This provision is applied 
in situations when, for example, a weak party, such as an impecunious spouse, 
undertakes liability as a surety. Crucially, German courts have not followed 
suggestions by the academic community to apply the good faith clause in 
these cases.52 It is under the auspices of an expanded notion of when a contract 
would be contrary to public policy, covered by § 138(2) BGB, rather than 
through applying the good faith clause, that courts provide relief. The reader 
may be forgiven for thinking that we may have descended rather too deeply 
into the technicalities of the German Civil Code, but the point is important: 
it shows how closely related these sources of relief are, especially when they 
have to be applied in situations where there is a combination of terms that are 
onerous and of weakness on the side of a party who assented to them.
The fact pattern of weak contracting parties entering into onerous 
agreements is hardly unfamiliar in South African law. Sometimes, the courts 
have been able to provide relief by applying the established rules on mental 
capacity,53 mistake,54 or undue influence,55 Sometimes it takes into account 
the defect of consent more indirectly. As we have seen, courts may invalidate 
or refuse to enforce terms if they violate public policy. While the focus in such 
a determination is on the substance of the terms, courts may take into account 
49 See the text to part 5 2 1 2 (e) below.
50 See the text to part 2 2 3 above.
51 See § 138(2) BGB: 
“In particular, a legal transaction is void by which a person, by exploiting the predicament, inexperience, 
lack of sound judgment or considerable weakness of will of another, causes himself or a third party, in 
exchange for an act of performance, to be promised or granted pecuniary advantages which are clearly 
disproportionate to the performance”. 
 Further see Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) para 104.
52 See Whittaker & Zimmermann “Good Faith in European Contract Law” in Good Faith 29-30; BVerfGE 
89, 214 sqq.
53 See the majority judgment in Eerste Nasionale Bank Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (A).
54 See Katzen v Mguno 1954 1 SA 277 (T); Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 208-209 (the signatory of a 
suretyship did not understand the nature of the document, and the notary failed to explain its import).
55 See Preller v Jordaan 1956 1 SA 483 (A). 
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the procedural problem of an inequality in the parties’ relative bargaining 
power (albeit that this is rarely decisive).56 
Furthermore, calls for resorting to good faith as a basis for providing relief 
in these cases of weakness have been rejected.57 To some extent, this is 
understandable; the leading judgment that supported such a development left 
it rather unclear how the concept of good faith is to be understood, and how 
it fitted in with established principles, such as the law of undue influence.58 
More recent case law has, however, shown that good faith could indirectly 
influence determining when a party has exerted undue influence on another.59 
But this still leaves unclear what the position is with other forms of weakness, 
such as illiteracy, inexperience, and lack of bargaining power.60 Here courts 
could go down the road of taking various forms of weakness into account 
when deciding whether to invalidate or refuse to enforce an onerous contract 
on public policy grounds (which would be more in line with the German 
approach), or they could expand the range of categories of defective consent. 
However, courts traditionally are wary of doing so; the law of undue influence, 
in particular, has not followed the international trend of protecting a greater 
range of weak contracting parties.61 
3  Applying the good faith clause in practice: its three main 
functions and their potential relevance in the South African 
context 
The preceding overview has focussed on some prominent examples of 
specific provisions in the German Civil Code that could be regarded as giving 
expression to good faith as a value. It is therefore clearly not the exclusive 
domain of the good faith clause to perform this task. A comparison with South 
African law showed that we also recognise a variety of rules that similarly 
fulfil the function of promoting good faith as value. We turn now to the 
various fields of application of the German good faith clause, but it should be 
apparent that understanding it requires a constant awareness of the broader 
context, set out above, in which this clause operates.
What does the good faith clause of modern German law actually do? 
Given its extraordinary breadth, it is not surprising that jurists have sought 
to identify key groupings or categories of cases where this clause could be 
56 See eg Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59; this is an established practice in restraint of 
trade cases (see Basson v Chilwan 1993 3 SA 742 (A)).
57 See eg Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA).
58 See the minority judgment of Olivier JA in Eerste Nasionale Bank Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (A).
59 See Gerolomou Constructions (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 2011 4 SA 500 (GNP) para 22. Tuchten J inter alia 
referred to earlier decisions applying the exceptio doli cases to formulate a test of unconscionability 
requiring “a substantial degree of unscrupulousness, an intention to oppress, or a departure from the 
values to which right-thinking people subscribe in the relevant context”.
60 See Beadica 231 CC v Trustees, Oregon Unit Trust 2018 1 SA 549 (WCC). Davis J held that the parties’ 
failure to exercise an option to renew a lease timeously according to the terms of the contract could be 
excused, partly because of their inexperience and the need to promote black economic empowerment. An 
unusual feature of the judgment, at least when viewed from a comparative perspective, is that it does not 
indicate that there was a conscious exploitation of this weakness. 
61 See eg JE du Plessis “Threats and Excessive Benefits or Unfair advantage” in H MacQueen 
& R Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law – Scots and South African Perspectives (2006) 176.
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applied. The focus here will be on a particularly influential threefold division, 
which can be traced to Roman notions on the various functions that could 
be fulfilled by officials entrusted with developing the law.62 The distinction 
differentiates between the (i) “supplementing”, (ii) “limiting”, and (iii) 
“correcting” functions of good faith.63 
This division has proved to be useful, if not essential in German law to 
prevent uncertainty over the scope of the good faith clause; it structures the 
mass of material on its application and alerts judges to relevant decisions that 
could guide their determinations.64 It must be emphasised, however, that these 
descriptive categories are not exclusive, and that in some fact patterns the good 
faith clause could fulfil more than one function.65 The boundaries between the 
categories are also not watertight. Thus, imposing additional or supplementary 
duties on parties (function i), or correcting a contract by invalidating terms 
(function iii) could also be described as exercises in limiting parties’ rights 
(function ii). These problems could be resolved by more exact definitions of 
what the domain of each function is, but, by and large, these challenges have 
not subverted the practical application of the division. These three functions 
will now be considered in turn with a view to determining whether they could 
also provide guidance on how to give effect to good faith in the South African 
context.
4  The “supplementing” function of good faith: defining the main 
parties’ duties and creating ancillary duties 
4 1 Introduction
Parties normally have a relatively clear idea about the most important 
aspects of performance. These aspects could, for example, include what to pay, 
what object to deliver or make available for use, or what service to render. The 
parties could also agree on further key issues relating to performance, such as 
when and where it is to take place. But this still leaves a host of other matters 
unclear, which the law may be expected to address. To further this purpose, 
German law has relied on the good faith clause to develop numerous rules 
62 German authors came to appreciate that the basic problem with a general clause like § 242 BGB is that 
it concerns the relationship between those who have to apply the law and the law itself. They drew 
an analogy with the role that the praetor played when dealing with the Roman civil law. According to 
Papinian D 1 1 7 1, the praetorian law (ius praetorium) is “that which in the public interest the praetors 
have introduced in aid or supplementation or correction of the civil law (ius civile).” On the adoption and 
refinement of this division in German law see MW Hesselink “Chapter 26 The Concept of Good Faith” 
in A Hartkamp et al (eds) Towards a European Civil Code 3 ed (2004) 475-476, pointing to the role of 
Siebert; further influential champions include F Wieacker Zur rechtstheoretischen Präzisierung des § 
242 BGB (1956) 20-21, referring to G Boehmer Grundlagen der bürgerlichen Rechtsordnung II, 2 (1952) 
20 sqq, esp 73 sq. Further see M Storme “Good Faith and the Contents of Contracts in European Private 
Law” (2003) 7 EJCL para 7.
63 On the division in general see Jauernig § 242 para 5; Münchener Kommentar § 242 paras 140-149; Palandt 
§ 242 paras 13-14; Schmidt “Art 1:201: Good Faith and Fair Dealing” in Commentaries on European 
Contract Laws 114-116.
64 See Historisch-kritischer Kommentar § 242 para 88. 
65 See Münchener Kommentar § 242 paras 133, 148.
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that fulfil the “supplementing”66 function of defining the main obligations 
more clearly, or of establishing additional or ancillary obligations.67 Examples 
of various duties that traditionally arise when the general clause fulfils this 
function will first be discussed below, followed by a perspective on their 
potential relevance in the South African context. It must be pointed out, 
though, that in 2001 the legislature adopted § 241 II BGB, which essentially 
determines that an obligation may impose (supplementary) duties to take 
into account the rights and interests of another party. This provision could be 
regarded as also giving expression to the demands of good faith.
4 2  Examples of duties imposed when the good faith clause performs 
its supplementing function
4 2 1  The duty to take into account the interests of the other party 




Our first contractual duty derived from the good faith clause relates to 
performance of the main obligations. It entails that the debtor must take 
into account the interests of the creditor when performing, and must do so 
according to the spirit, rather than the letter of the contract.69 This duty is 
breached if, for example, a debtor seeks to perform at an inopportune moment, 
such as in the evening or on a public holiday.70 A creditor is further obliged not 
to refuse performance that deviates only minimally from the agreed standard, 
for example when a debtor pays by way of a bank guaranteed cheque instead 
of cash, or by way of a credit transfer to another account of the creditor.71 
These duties of mutual consideration of another’s interests could assume 
particular significance in the context of long-term relational contracts. For 
example, a franchisee could be obliged to take the franchisor’s interests into 
account when marketing the franchise as a whole.72 Complying with these 
duties does not, however, require of a party to subject his own interests to that 
of the other party.




Apart from indicating how the main obligations are to be performed, the 
good faith clause is also the basis for imposing certain additional or ancillary 
duties. Parties are under a duty of loyalty to ensure that the purpose of the 
66 Reference has also been made to a “supportive” function of good faith (see Du Plessis (2002) 65 THRHR 
397 409).
67 See Palandt § 242 paras 22-37; Jauernig § 242 paras 17-31; Ebke & Steinhauer “The Doctrine of Good 
Faith in German Contract Law” in Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law 177-178.
68 The Rücksichtpflicht or Rücksichtnahmepflicht of the debtor and the creditor - see Jauernig § 242 para 17; 
Münchener Kommentar § 242 paras 180-188.
69 See Jauernig § 242 para 17.
70 See Münchener Kommentar § 242 para 181; Jauernig § 242 para 17. 
71 See Münchener Kommentar § 242 para 182; Jauernig § 242 para 18.
72 See Münchener Kommentar § 242 paras 181-182. 
73 The Leistungstreuepflicht – see Palandt § 242 paras 27-31; Jauernig § 242 para 27.
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performance materialises, or, to put it negatively, to ensure that its purpose 
is not subverted. Thus, they could be obliged to take preparatory steps, such 
as checking that goods are properly packed, or to ensure that the purpose of 
performance is not subverted retroactively. For example, a seller of technical 
industrial products may be obliged to keep the necessary replacement parts 
in stock, or the seller of a business may not after the sale compete with the 
purchaser in a manner that results in the goodwill being dissipated.74 The duty 
to ensure that the purpose of the contract is fulfilled is also clearly breached if 
a debtor seriously and definitively refuses to perform.
4 2 3 Ancillary duties to co-operate with the other party
75
 
Ensuring that the contract’s purpose is achieved does not only require 
loyalty, as we have seen above, but also co-operation. Parties are accordingly 
obliged, in the interests of promoting good faith, to co-operate so that the 
conclusion or the performance of a contract is officially approved, if such 
approval is required; this duty also extends to not doing anything to prevent 
such approval being obtained. Ancillary duties to co-operate according to a 
good faith standard could further be imposed after a contract has terminated: 
a former landlord may therefore have to tolerate a display sign indicating that 
a former tenant has changed premises.76 Finally, it bears mentioning that a 
failure to co-operate with the debtor to ensure performance could amount to 
breach (mora creditoris), but that this is regulated separately in the code.77
4 2 4 Ancillary duties to protect or not to harm the other party
78
 
It is trite that a person who wrongfully harms another could be delictually 
liable to pay damages. But in addition to this liability, German law has relied 
on the good faith clause to impose duties on parties not to harm each other in 
preparing for and rendering performance, or during the pre-contractual phase. 
Thus, business premises must not be hazardous or harmful to the other party’s 
health, and care must be exercised not to harm another party’s property while 
being in possession of it; sometimes, as in the case when a jeweller repairs 
another’s jewellery, there may even be a duty to insure against a loss. Again, 
duties to protect or to prevent harm to another party could also exist after 
the contractual relationship has terminated. Thus, a business advisor may be 
bound by duties of confidentiality, or a doctor may be obliged to grant access 
to a patient’s records.79
74 
Palandt § 242 para 28; Jauernig § 242 para 27; see Carey Miller (1980) 87 SALJ 531 535.
75 The Mitwirkungspflicht – see Palandt § 242 para 32; Jauernig § 242 para 23.
76 
Jauernig § 242 para 30.
77 See §§ 293 sqq.
78 The Schutzpflicht – see Palandt § 242 paras 35-36; Jauernig § 242 paras 24-26; Schlechtriem “Good Faith 
in German Law” 13-14.
79 
Jauernig § 242 para 31.
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4 2 5  Ancillary pre-contractual duties to inform and disclose
80
There is no general duty in German law to inform or disclose information to 
a prospective contract partner. Thus, a seller does not have to warn a purchaser 
that the purchase price might be very high, or that the contract may not 
generally be to his benefit. The law expects as point of departure that parties 
have to inform themselves. However, it is recognised that, exceptionally, good 
faith may oblige one party to inform another about circumstances which 
are known to him and which are discernibly of decisive importance for the 
creation of the contract, its proper implementation, or achieving its purpose. 
Whether such a duty arises depends on the circumstances; thus, it may be vital 
for the purchaser of land to be aware that building permission is required, or 
to know whether a party qualifies for a tax deduction: another party who has 
this information may be liable to disclose it. But, as indicated above, other 
provisions of the code could apply if a failure to comply with a duty to disclose 
in the pre-contractual phase amounts to fraud,81 or amounts to wrongful pre-
contractual conduct (culpa in contrahendo).82
4 3  South African perspective
South African law recognises a number of duties on how performance is 
to be made or received, as well as on co-operating to ensure that a contract is 
fulfilled. Some examples relating to performance are quite specific and can be 
linked to those of German law referred to above. A creditor is obliged not to 
insist on payment in cash if the impression was created that payment by cheque 
would suffice,83 and South African law has rules on what time of day would be 
appropriate to perform or insist on performance, thereby considering the other 
party’s interests.84 Some of these duties operate even after the contract was 
performed. Thus, the seller of a business remains bound to the purchaser not 
to subvert the purpose of the sale agreement by destroying the goodwill of the 
business through canvassing its customers.85 Other duties are more general: a 
creditor has to co-operate with the debtor to enable performance, and commits 
breach in the form of mora creditoris if he does not do so. Both parties are 
obliged not to repudiate the contract by evincing the clear intention no longer 
to be bound by it. In the pre-contractual phase, South African law further 
recognises that one party may in certain exceptional circumstances have to 
80 On a party’s Aufklärungspflicht and Auskunftspflicht see Ebke & Steinhauer “The Doctrine of Good Faith 
in German Contract Law” in Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law 171 178); Jauernig § 242 paras 19-21; 
Palandt § 242 para 37.
81 See the text to part 2 2 3 above.
82 See the text to part 2 2 4 above.
83 See JC de Wet & AH Van Wyk De Wet en Van Wyk – Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 5 
ed GF Lubbe (ed) (1992) 265-266.
84 See Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 499; further cf s 19(3) of the CPA.
85 The courts recognized that the seller of corporeal property is bound by duties, such as to warrant against 
eviction. These duties were extended analogously to protect the purchaser of incorporeal property. See 
A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker 1981 3 SA 406 (A) 414G-415B, 418-420; Grainco (Pty) Ltd Van der 
Merwe 2016 4 SA 303 (SCA) paras 25-26; Van der Watt v Jonker SCA case no 837/2010 of 23-09-2011 para 
9; also see Den Braven (Pty) Ltd v Pillay 2008 6 SA 229 (D) para 35.
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disclose information to the other, and factors such as involuntary reliance of 
the one on the other are taken into account in making this determination.
The duties above are contained either in established common-law rules, 
or in consumer legislation. According to our common law, the courts enjoy 
the inherent power to imply new terms into contracts,86 or to change existing 
implied terms.87 The duty not to repudiate, for example, has been located 
in such an ex lege implied term.88 Our courts may also apply standardised 
rules or naturalia to certain types of contracts.89 Thus, the seller’s duty not 
to canvass customers could be regarded as one of the naturalia of a contract 
of sale.90 As far as consumer legislation is concerned, sub-sections 19(2) and 
(3) of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (“CPA”) contain “implied 
conditions” regarding the time and place of performance; if no time is 
specified, suppliers may not require of the consumer to accept delivery or 
performance of a service at an unreasonable time. Section 65 in turn places 
a duty on a supplier to exercise care in dealing with the consumer’s property 
in its possession.
If South African law could perform all these “supplementing” tasks with 
common-law rules or legislation, without relying on a good faith clause, where 
does good faith fit into the general scheme of things? Traditionally, its effect 
is only indirect. Thus, in determining whether to read terms into contracts 
that complement or restrict obligations, courts may take into account or 
refer to good faith.91 And the naturalia of specific types of contracts have 
been described as “concrete manifestations of the basic principle of bona 
fides”.92 However, the courts are not willing to resort to good faith to read 
simply any term into the contract that (they believe) justice may require.93 
When reading terms into contracts, the demands of good faith are not the 
overriding consideration or test; courts consider further factors, such as 
public policy, commercial expedience, and even at a general level, what 
86 See South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) para 28. Courts thereby aid 
the development of the common law in accordance with s 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (see South African Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie 2010 3 SA 601 (SCA) para 
13).
87 See South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 3232 (SCA). The Constitutional Court 
has warned, however, about the need for sensitivity regarding the impact of these changes on existing 
contracts – see Mighty Solutions t/a Orlando Service Station v Engen Petroleum Ltd 2016 1 SA 621 (CC) 
para 47.
88 See Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 1 SA 645 (A) 652F.
89 
South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) para 28; further see Bredenkamp 
v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 6; Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” 
in Southern Cross 245; Du Plessis (2002) 65 THRHR 397 409.
90 See Grainco (Pty) Ltd v Van der Merwe 2016 4 SA 303 (SCA) para 26; further see Bradfield Christie’s 
Law of Contract in South Africa 428.
91 See Replication Technology Group v Gallo Africa Ltd 2009 5 SA 531 (GSJ) para 16 n 49; South African 
Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) para 28. For a comparative perspective see 
M Hogg “The Implication of Terms-in-fact: Good Faith, Contextualism and Interpretation” [2017] 85 The 
George Washington LR 1660.
92 Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in Southern Cross 245. See South African Forestry Co Ltd v York 
Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) para 28.
93 
Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 1 SA 645 (A); also see Barkhuizen 
v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 80-82; Replication Technology Group v Gallo Africa Ltd 2009 5 SA 
531 (GSJ) para 16 n 49; South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) para 28.
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parties would expect to be included in the contract.94 Finally, in the context of 
pre-contractual disclosure, good faith also plays an indirect role by aiding in 
determining when a duty to speak arises, but again we are not dealing with a 
direct application of a good faith rule.95 
At this stage, the reader may perhaps be puzzled. Why did German law feel 
the need to resort so extensively to the good faith clause to impose duties that 
define or supplement the main duties of performance, whereas South African 
law, which shares civilian roots, imposes at least some of the duties without 
recognising such a rule? This phenomenon could be explained by examining 
the way in which German law was codified. A code tries to be comprehensive, 
but it never can be.96 When it does not provide a rule, this creates a problem. 
One way of solving the problem is to rely on an open-ended norm. The 
codifiers could not include all the rules relating to performance that were 
recognised in earlier uncodified civil law. They had to restrict themselves to 
articulating main duties. To recognise some of the duties above, German law 
had to rely on the good faith clause to provide a basis for their recognition.97 
The uncodified South African common law in turn allows courts, inter alia 
through applying existing rules or reading in implied terms or naturalia into 
contracts, to do work that German courts could only do by invoking the good 
faith clause.
5  The limiting function of good faith: constraints on exercising a 
right in an improper manner 
5 1  Introduction 
We now approach the second and currently most important field of 
application of the good faith clause in German law, namely to limit or prevent 
a party from improperly exercising a right.98 The application of the good 
faith clause to fulfil such a function may at first appear rather unusual, if not 
downright contradictory. If a party has a right, should it not by definition be 
94 See Alfred McAlpine & Son v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 3 SA 506 (A) 532-533; Van 
Huyssteen et al Contract 272, 276-277. Compare Article 5.1.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts on implied obligations, which states that they stem from 
(a) the nature and purpose of the contract; 
(b) practices established between the parties and usages; 
(c) good faith and fair dealing; 
(d) reasonableness.
95 See Meskin NO v Anglo-American Corporation of SA Ltd 1968 4 SA 793 (W) 802; Zimmermann “Good 
Faith and Equity” in Southern Cross 246, 248; Savage and Lovemore Mining (Pty) Ltd v International 
Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd 1987 2 SA 149 (W) 198. In Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Prinsloo (Prinsloo 
Intervening) 2000 3 SA 576 (C) 584-585, good faith was regarded as the basis for imposing a duty on a 
party who applied for a bond to disclose to the bank that it had recently entered into a lease agreement.
96 See Schlechtriem “Good Faith in German Law” 8-9.
97 12-13.
98 
Unzulässige Rechtsausübung – see Jauernig § 242 paras 32-36; Palandt § 242 paras 38-41; Münchener 
Kommentar § 242 paras 202-208. Different terminology is used in Staudinger § 242 para 211-318. See 
especially Jauernig § 242 para 33 on the risk of judicial overreach (further see the text to part 2 1 2 above). 
Reference will be made here generally to the situation where a party exercises a right, but this will only 
be used as a short hand description for a broader range of actions covered by the good faith clause. These 
actions include raising a defence, exploiting a legal position and invoking legal institutions in an improper 
manner (see Jauernig § 242 para 34).
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impossible for the right to be improperly exercised?99 The short answer is no. 
It is well-established in the civil-law tradition that in exceptional cases it may 
be justified to impose such limitations, for example when a party’s motives are 
so suspect, or actions are so contradictory, or so fail to give effect to legitimate 
interests, that enforcement of a right could be regarded as unreasonable.100 
But these are of course vague descriptions of situations where exercising 
rights may have to be limited, and to make this category more manageable, 
commentators have devised various subcategories, describing the most impor - 
tant cases. 
The focus will be on three main categories of improperly exercising a 
right that have been particularly prominent.101 The first category deals with 
exercising a right in a manner that can be described as “abusive”, the second 
with “dishonest prior conduct”, and the third with conduct that “contradicts 
earlier behaviour”. These categories are admittedly rather abstract (a not 
uncommon phenomenon in expositions in civil-law commentaries), but they 
do become more concrete when considering examples that illustrate their 
respective fields of application.
This notion that good faith could be violated by improperly exercising a 
right is especially significant from a South African perspective. Our law used 
to recognise the exceptio doli, which was a legal device that our courts could 
employ to prevent a party from exercising a right in a manner that did not 
measure up to the good faith standard. In effect, the exceptio doli fulfilled a 
function comparable to the German good faith clause.102 However, in 1988 
it was held in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas (“Bank of 
Lisbon”)103 that the exceptio doli has no place in our law. Doctrinally, the 
exceptio doli may indeed have had a problematic pedigree. However, our 
courts must ensure that our common law remains vibrant and responsive to 
real needs.104 The question therefore inevitably arises whether abolishing the 
exceptio doli made our law lose an instrument that could serve the purpose 
of preventing a party from improperly exercising a right. Zimmermann 
prophesised three decades ago that the exceptio doli may “haunt the courts 
and legal writers from its grave”.105 As we will soon see, this prophesy has 
been fulfilled: determining when a party may be prevented from exercising a 
contractual right is now one of the most pressing problems in modern contract 
99 See Koukoudis v Abrina 1772 (Pty) Ltd 2016 5 SA 352 (SCA); Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 
12.
100 See in general Jauernig § 242 para 33. Perhaps one could even say that in these cases parties are acting 
beyond the scope of the right, properly defined, rather than improperly exercising the right.
101 Commentaries use various headings to classify the relevant material. For the general clause to apply there 
has to be a special relationship (Sonderbeziehung) between the parties (see the text to part 2 1 3 above), 
but it is not required that the party whose conduct is being objected to has to be at fault, and neither is 
absence of fault a requirement for seeking relief (see Jauernig § 242 para 35).
102 See Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in Southern Cross 226; Whittaker & Zimmermann “Good 
faith in European Contract Law” in Whittaker & Zimmermann (eds) Good Faith 19. 
103 1988 3 SA 580 (A).
104 See Erasmus (1989) SALJ 666 676-677; Beadica 231 CC v Trustees, Oregon Unit Trust 2018 1 SA 549 
(WCC) paras 12-16, 43.
105 
The Law of Obligations 677.
GIVING PRACTICAL EFFECT TO GOOD FAITH 397
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
law.106 So the question is how to move forward, and to help us address this 
problem, let us then again turn to German experiences with applying the good 
faith clause for potential guidance.
5 2  Exercising a right in an abusive manner
107
Our first improper way of exercising a right, and thereby violating the good 
faith clause, is exercising it in an abusive manner. These are strong words. 
They require more than merely acting unfairly or unreasonably: one party 
has to pursue no interest, or significantly less protectable interests than those 
of the other party, and enforcement must have a grossly unfair effect on such 
a party. Nonetheless, the standard is not quite as high as that posed in § 226 
BGB, which we came across earlier; it will be recalled that that provision, 
which has a counterpart in the South African common law, covers cases of 
“abuse of rights” that amount to harassment, where one party’s purpose is 
purely to harm another.108 For purposes of applying the good faith clause, 
exercising a right in an abusive manner does not require such an intention. 
The following examples illustrate its application.
5 2 1  Exercising a right in pursuit of ulterior purposes, or of interests 
disproportionate to those of the other party
109
 
5 2 1 1 German law 
At the heart of the notion in German law that a party could violate the good 
faith clause by exercising a right in an abusive manner lies the conviction that 
rights are granted for particular purposes, and to pursue certain interests. To 
exercise a right in pursuit of interests that have nothing to do with the right, 
or are relatively insignificant, could therefore amount to abusive conduct. 
This application of the good faith clause could be regarded as a modern 
manifestation of the exceptio doli, which has in effect been subsumed under 
this clause.110 
A few examples illustrate this general approach. As far as the lack of 
protectable interests is concerned, a landlord may not exercise a right to 
terminate a lease merely because the tenant complained about noise pollution;111 
and a lessee may not exercise a right to terminate an agreement of lease and 
to nominate a sub-lessee if the sub-lessee actually has no interest in using 
106 See the text to part 5 2 1 2 below.
107 
Missbräuchliche Rechtsausübung – see Jauernig § 242 para 37; further see generally Münchener 
Kommentar § 242 paras 243 sqq 438 sqq; Staudinger § 242 para 255-283.
108 See the text to part 2 2 2 above. 
109 See generally, Jauernig § 242 paras 37-43; Palandt § 242 paras 50-54; Münchener Kommentar § 242 paras 
446-490; Staudinger § 242 para 255-283. The heading above is a broad generalisation of the German 
commentaries’ at times rather subtly distinguished sub-categories of situations where rights are exercised 
in an abusive manner.
110 See Jauernig § 242 para 37. For purposes of obtaining a broader perspective, it may be added that § 275(2) 
BGB gives effect to good faith by excluding claims for specific performance if the expense and effort 
required to perform would be “grossly disproportionate” to the creditor’s interest in performance. See 5 
2 1 2 below on the relevant South African law. 
111 See Münchener Kommentar § 242 para 246 n 769, referring to AG Mannheim, WuM 1973, 3.
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the property.112 It may also be contrary to good faith for a purchaser to cancel 
a contract due to a temporary breach if the purchaser did not suffer any harm 
and made full use of the object sold. Thus, the purchaser of a crane may not 
exercise a right to cancel the sale on the ground that the seller committed 
breach by not ensuring that the crane displays an official sign of approval, if 
the approval was obtained before the purchaser tried to cancel the sale.113 
Abuse of rights by the pursuit of external, irrelevant interests is in turn 
illustrated by a case involving a bank which had a claim, amply secured by a 
mortgage bond, against a client, but decided to aid another bank, which had an 
unsecured claim against the client, by taking cession of that bank’s claim and 
paying it for the cession. Banks may indeed in the normal course of business 
take cession of third party claims against their clients, but in this case the bank 
pursued an external, unrelated purpose: the client did not have to expect that 
its bank would use the security to further the interests of third parties who had 
nothing to do with the client’s relationship with the bank.114
Thus far, the emphasis was on cases where it could be said that the 
party seeking enforcement had no protectable interest at all or an ulterior 
purpose. But, in accordance with the fundamental underlying notion that 
good faith requires a reciprocal or mutual consideration of the interests 
of the parties, enforcement of a right could be denied even though a party 
seeking enforcement has some interest in pursuing the right, but this interest 
is disproportional, or pales into insignificance compared to the interests of 
the other party.115 It does not require much reflection to appreciate that this 
principle, noble as it may sound, has to be applied restrictively. Good faith 
does not require that parties must subject their personal interests to those of 
the other party; on the contrary, they are generally free to pursue self-interest, 
and even minor breaches of duties could still have consequences.116 However, 
a creditor should not take the drastic step of cancelling a contract due to a 
debtor’s failure to perform by an agreed date for performance if the delay is 
negligible and is immaterial, taking into account the interests of the creditor; 
similar constraints could apply to resorting to a penalty clause in these 
circumstances.117 Likewise, a right to terminate could be exercised contrary 
to good faith if the creditor repeatedly tolerated breaches, creating a situation 
of reliance on this tolerance on the side of the debtor.118 
5 2 1 2 South African perspective 
South African courts are not unfamiliar with the challenge of determining 
whether to limit or restrain parties from exercising certain contractual rights 
or powers. But our law does not accept that good faith is a standard that 
courts could resort to directly when a right is exercised in an abusive manner. 
112 See Jauernig § 242 para 3b, referring to BGH NJW-RR, 307.
113 See BGH 90, 198 (204).
114 BGH NJW 1981, 1600; 1983, 1735 sq.
115 On Geringfügigkeit, and Unverhältnismäßigkeit see Palandt § 242 para 53; Jauernig § 242 paras 40 sqq. 
116 Despite being accommodated to some extent in the code: see § 281 I 3 BGB; § 320 II BGB; § 323 V 2 BGB.
117 See BGH NJW 85, 267; Jauernig § 242 para 40.
118 
Palandt § 242 para 53, relying on BGH NJW 03, 2448.
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This prompts the question how we deal with fact patterns where German 
law invokes the good faith clause for this purpose. We can proceed from the 
specific to the general, from a particular case where our common law accepts 
that a court may prevent a party from enforcing a contractual right, to more 
general grounds for awarding such relief.119
Our specific example comes from the law of lease. Landlords generally 
enjoy a contractual right to approve any assignment of the lease by the tenant 
to a third party. When exercising this right, a landlord is obliged to take the 
tenant’s interests into account, and he may not pursue an entirely personal 
or unrelated purpose, as opposed to being influenced by attributes of the 
tenant or by the proposed use of the premises.120 It can be questioned, though, 
what the doctrinal basis is for denying enforcement of a right in this case.121 
If the lack of a sufficient interest warrants such a denial of enforcement of 
a right in this case, why not in others, and on what basis? Justice demands 
consistency. Unfortunately, the case law, which is strongly influenced by 
English authorities, does not reveal such a basis. German law, as we have 
seen, could directly have tested any rejection of the assignation with reference 
to the general good faith standard. But our courts cannot do the same. We 
therefore have to look elsewhere. In this regard some alternative routes can 
be considered. 
(a) The doctrine of abuse of rights
The first, and most obvious is to resort to a legal construct that we have 
already come across,122 namely the doctrine of abuse of rights (misbruik van 
reg). In South African law, relief could be provided in terms of this doctrine 
if our landlord in the case above actually exercised the right to refuse consent 
to sub-let with the purpose to harm the tenant, and out of “sheer bloody-
119 These general grounds deal with cases when there is a defined contractual right. The following situations 
are not considered here. First, the right to claim specific performance is subject to a well-established 
judicial discretion to refuse it, for example in cases of hardship (compare Haynes v Kingwilliamstown 
Municipality 1951 2 SA 371 (A), where enforcement of Haynes’s right to water would have had 
devastating consequences for a community). On the position in German law see the text to part 5 2 1 1 
above. Secondly, we are also not concerned here with discretions to determine the content of contracts 
(also see the text to part 2 2 1 above). It is well-established that standards of reasonableness or fairness 
regulate the manner in which such discretions are exercised (see NBS Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg River 
Drive CC 1999 4 SA 928 (SCA) 937, where reference was also made to German law). In applying this 
discretion, considerations such as the interests of the party exercising it could be taken into account. 
However, when performing this regulating or limiting function, the courts do not resort to a general good 
faith principle. Hints that it may be an alternative route to achieve this outcome (see NBS Boland Bank Ltd 
v One Berg River Drive CC 1999 4 SA 928 (SCA) para 28) have not been warmly received (see Brisley 
v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 16; but also see Erasmus v Senwes Ltd 2006 3 SA 529 (T) 538-539, for 
a more positive view of good faith in this context).
120 
Bryer and other NNO v Teabosa CC t/a Simon Chuter Properties 1993 1 SA 128 (C) 137-138. Where the 
holder of a contractual right to grant permission is a public authority, exercising such a right could also be 
limited by principles of administrative law (see Kouga Municipality v De Beer 2008 5 SA 503 (E)).
121 A further example derives from the law of cession, which may prevent a cessionary from exercising a 
right to cede a claim if it would prejudice the debtor (see Corinth Properties (Pty) Ltd v Firstrand Bank 
Ltd 2002 6 SA 540 (W) paras 7-9).
122 See the text to part 2 2 2 above.
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mindedness”, as the courts have called it.123 However, as in German law, it 
is very rare in these cases of harassment that parties succeed in relying on 
the doctrine of abuse of rights with its strict requirements.124 Ultimately, as 
indicated earlier, in German law parties would rather rely on the good faith 
clause when a right is exercised in an abusive manner that does not quite 
amount to harassment or acting “bloody-mindedly”. In the South African 
context, we therefore also have to distinguish between situations where the 
“doctrine of abuse of rights” applies, and other cases where a right is exercised 
in an abusive manner, but without the intention to harass. It is the latter cases 
that are of concern here, and which will be considered further below.
(b) Interpretation
Secondly, a party could potentially be prevented from exercising a right 
on the basis that a proper interpretation of the relevant contractual terms 
indicated that no such right exists. Such a process could, for example, reveal, 
that the right was only granted for a particular purpose. Prior to the Bank 
of Lisbon decision,125 it was regarded as an expression of bad faith and 
unconscionable conduct to use a deed of suretyship for a purpose for which it 
was not intended, and hence enforcement could be defeated with the exceptio 
doli.126 But, as we have seen, it subsequently has been suggested that the key to 
that case was to interpret the security properly, which may have revealed that 
the bank actually did not enjoy a right to enforce it for an external or unrelated 
purpose.127 Ultimately, however, we are not really dealing with a judicial 
discretion to refuse enforcement of a right, but rather with a determination of 
what the content of the right is in the first place.
(c) Reading in implied terms
A further possible general ground for preventing a party from enforcing a 
right is that an implied term qualifies the way in which it is exercised. Thus, 
in a Bank of Lisbon type of situation,128 there may have been scope for finding 
that it was an implied term of the contract establishing the security that it may 
not be used for purposes unrelated to the parties. A similar restriction based 
on an implied term could potentially govern the manner in which a right to 
123 See F W Knowles (Pty) Ltd v Cash-In (Pty) Ltd 1986 4 SA 641 (C) 652A. Also see Koumantarakis Group 
CC v Mystic River Investment 45 (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 404 (D), which concerned exercising a discretion (or 
right) to refuse a guarantee; it was held that a party cannot refuse a guarantee “from pure caprice, but at 
least it must exercise an honest judgment in deciding whether the guarantee is sufficient and acceptable” 
(para 35). Also see Dharumpal Transport (Pty) Ltd v Dharumpal 1956 1 SA 700 (A).
124 See F W Knowles (Pty) Ltd v Cash-In (Pty) Ltd 1986 4 SA 641 (C) where the minority held that the 
tenant did not succeed in proving “an abuse of rights, unconscionable conduct or mala fides or even 
a comparable situation to that in the International Drilling case [International Drilling Fluids Ltd v 
Louisville Investments (Uxbridge) Ltd 1986 1 All ER 321 (CA)]” (658A). This suggest that the grounds for 
relief are broader than just abuse of rights in the narrow sense.
125 
Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A).
126 
Rand Bank Ltd v Rubenstein 1981 2 SA 207 (W) 215.
127 See Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 35.
128 
Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A).
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terminate or cancel a contract is exercised.129 Reading in such a term could 
thereby indirectly give effect to good faith as underlying value.130 However, 
courts are reticent to do so, and certainly would not do it merely because 
enforcement would then be fair.131 
(d) Reading in tacit terms
Depending on the circumstances, a tacit term, based on the actual or 
presumed intentions of the parties, could restrict the manner in which a right 
is exercised. Thus, where a party seeks to exercise a right to terminate a 
contract, such a tacit term could limit it to being done for a specific purpose. 
However, as in the case of implied terms, strict rules govern the determination 
whether such a tacit term exists. Again, fairness or reasonableness in itself is 
not a ground for making such a determination. The focus is on the actual or 
presumed shared intention of the parties determined according to the bystander 
test. Even though exercising a right may have very harsh consequences for 
one party, a tacit term qualifying the term to make it less harsh will not be 
found to exist if the other party would not have agreed on it according to the 
bystander test.132 Cases like Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) 
Ltd (“Maphango”)133 reflect a reticence to find that such a term could limit a 
party in terms of the motive behind or purpose for which a right is exercised.134
(e)  The rule that a term would not be enforced if it would be contrary 
to public policy 
Our overview of common-law instruments that could limit a party in 
exercising a contractual right has thus far revealed that their scope is restricted 
and that these instruments do not come close to fulfilling a “limiting” role 
comparable to the German good faith clause. But one instrument still remains 
to be considered. It concerns the role of public policy in the law of contract. 
As indicated earlier, it is a general principle of our law of contract that courts 
129 See South African Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie 2010 3 SA 601 (SCA) on the possibility of 
implying such a term; but then obviously any relevant statutory context has to be taken into account.
130 See the text to part 4 3 above; Replication Technology Group v Gallo Africa Ltd 2009 5 SA 531 (GSJ) 16 
n 49.
131 See South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) para 28 and compare Harper 
v Morgan Guarantee Trust Co of New York, Johannesburg 2004 3 SA 253 (W) discussed in Hawthorne 
(2005) 17 SA Merc LJ 214.
132 See Consol Ltd t/a Consol Glass v Twee Jonge Gezellen (Pty) Ltd 2005 6 SA 1 (SCA) paras 48, 52-53.
133 2012 3 SA 531 (CC). The minority judgment paras 92 sqq, 115 sqq and the court a quo (Maphango 
v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2011 5 SA 19 (SCA) paras 13-21, especially para 20) rejected 
the contention that the right to terminate was qualified by a tacit term. However the majority in the 
Constitutional Court for judgment left it open whether the right to terminate was exercised properly in 
terms of the common law, since it regarded statutory remedies as applicable (see para 55).
134 Also see South African Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie 2010 3 SA 601 (SCA) para 12. In 
Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA), the aggrieved client did not even 
seek to rely on a tacit term qualifying the bank’s right to terminate the banker/client agreement (see para 
61).
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may refuse to enforce a valid right if this would violate public policy.135 When 
our courts exercise this power, could the outcomes be similar to those that 
arise when a German court applies the good faith clause to fulfil its limiting 
function? Let us consider the record.
First, we have rather obvious cases where a right is exercised for an 
improper, ulterior motive. Whether such a motive is present could in turn be 
determined by whether certain fundamental values or rights, such as the right 
to equality, is affected. Thus, according to Harms DP in Bredenkamp, a term 
in a lease that allows the tenant to sub-let with the landlord’s consent is valid, 
but would not be enforced “[s]hould the landlord attempt to use it to prevent 
the property being sublet in circumstances amounting to discrimination under 
the equality clause”; in these circumstances enforcement would be contrary 
to public policy.136 And it may be contrary to public policy to allow a party to 
invoke a non-variation clause with the ulterior purpose of not pursuing bona 
fide claims.137 These examples stand in contrast to the facts of Bredenkamp, 
where no improper or ulterior motive actuated the bank’s decision to terminate 
its suspect client’s account.138 
Secondly, we have situations where the interests of the party seeking to 
enforce a right are insignificant compared to the severe detriment which would 
be suffered by the person against whom enforcement is sought.139 A potential 
example concerns the way in which a creditor exercised an acceleration clause 
based on the debtor’s breach. Acceleration clauses are not per se invalid, but 
in Combined Developers v Arun Holdings (“Combined Developers”),140 
Davis J held that it would be contrary to public policy to allow a creditor to 
enforce such a clause where the debtor owed a mere R86,57 mora interest on 
a R7,6 million loan, and was not given some form of notice to pay the amount 
before the clause was invoked.141 The breach could therefore easily have been 
135 See the text to part 2 2 5 above. Neels would accept extending the application of the doctrine of abuse 
of rights in the law of contract, but only if the “doctrine of good faith” cannot fulfil the necessary 
“correcting” function (J Neels Tussen Regmatigheid en Onregmatigheid. ‘n Ondersoek na die Leerstuk 
van Oorskryding van Regte en Bevoegdhede as Uitvloeisel van die Korrigerende Werking van Redelikheid 
en Billikheid in die Reg met Besondere Verwysing na die Oorskryding van Eiendomsreg op Onroerende 
Goedere Rijksuniversiteit Leiden Thesis (1998) 87-88). But if the public policy rule can prevent improper 
exercising of a right, good faith does not have to fulfil this function.
136 
Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 47.
137 See Nyandeni Local Municipality v Hlazo 2010 4 SA 261 (ECM) (there, a corrupt employee invoked a 
non-variation clause to subvert disciplinary processes). 
138 In Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 3 SA 531 (CC), tenants argued that the landlord 
terminated leases solely to impose a rent increase beyond that permitted by the leases, and to frustrate the 
tenant’s rights in terms of rent-escalation clauses and avoid compliance with tribunal clauses (para 24). 
In effect, the argument is that an improper motive could result in a right being exercised in a manner that 
violates public policy. However, as indicated above, the majority of the Constitutional Court declined to 
determine whether the landlord’s right to terminate was improperly exercised under the common law. 
139 The interests of a party are of course also relevant in determining whether a term is per se contrary to 
public policy. Thus, according to the minority for judgment of Moseneke DCJ in Barkhuizen v Napier 
2007 5 SA 323 (CC), the 90-day time limitation clause was per se invalid because it was not apparent what 
legitimate purpose (or interest) would be served by the insurer imposing such an short time period (see 
para 113). The majority, however, held that there was insufficient evidence to make such a finding (see 
paras 84 sqq). Ironically, the insurer actually argued that its discretion to rely on the clause was subject to 
control according to a good faith standard, but the Court left open whether such a standard indeed applied 
(see paras 82, 118).
140 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) para 36.
141 Para 42.
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remedied to the creditor’s benefit, thereby avoiding the severely detrimental 
effects of accelerated payment on the debtor. Crucially, in delineating the 
contours of public policy, Davis J clearly was influenced by what good faith 
and reasonableness required.142 Thus, while South African law may not have a 
good faith clause like German law, it is through the public policy requirement 
that effect could be given to good faith as a value. And in this context, as 
German experiences also show, the discrepancy between the interests pursued 
by the creditor, compared to those of the debtor being harmed, could be 
indicative of a violation of this value. 
A further set of examples deal with situations where a party seeks to 
enforce a right of termination of the contract; this could for instance be when 
a lease is terminated by giving notice (as in Maphango),143 or when a contract 
is cancelled due to breach (as in Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd (“Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings”)).144 
In these cases, the other party argued that the courts should nonetheless hold 
that the right to terminate was not validly exercised or asserted. But could 
courts really find that a party may not invoke the right to terminate because 
its interests are so insignificant that enforcing this right would be contrary to 
public policy? This question lies at the epicentre of debates on the future of 
our law of contract.145 
In Maphango the landlord argued that the purpose of terminating the 
leases was to enable it to renovate inner city property to make leasing 
economically more viable; the tenant in turn argued that termination of the 
leases was contrary to public policy because it was unfair, and would affect 
their constitutional right to housing. The SCA decisively rejected the tenant’s 
argument, especially inasmuch as it suggested that (mere) unfairness could 
indicate a violation of public policy; and neither could good faith be relied on 
as a self-standing rule whereby the landlord’s conduct could be evaluated.146 
Theoretically, this case had the potential to set the table for the Constitutional 
Court to engage in-depth with determining how the parties’ respective interests 
influence whether a right of termination is exercised contrary to public policy. 
142 Para 41.
143 2012 3 SA 531 (CC).
144 2018 2 SA 314 (SCA), overruling Mohamed‘s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests 
(Pty) Ltd 2017 4 SA 243 (GJ). Also see AJP Properties CC v Sello 2018 1 SA 535 (GJ) paras 28 sqq, but 
the question there was whether eviction was warranted. Beadica 231 CC v Trustees, Oregon Unit Trust 
is dealt with above in the context of protecting weak parties, but it could be explained as a case where a 
court prevented a party from asserting that a contract had validly terminated by weighing up the parties’ 
respective interests, and concluding that the economic empowerment interests of the tenants outweighed 
those of the landlord. Botha v Rich NO 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) paras 50-51 considered the validity of 
exercising a right of cancellation, but did not consider public policy per se. The case was decided in the 
context of a statutory regime aimed at protecting purchasers of land on instalment by allowing them to 
claim transfer after half the price was paid. The purchaser was in arrears, but it was held that this did 
not entitle the seller to refuse transfer, which would be contrary to good faith (see paras 46-49). The past 
breach triggering the right to cancel could in effect be disregarded, since the seller was protected by a 
mortgage bond securing the purchaser’s remaining liability.
145 And indeed, global debates on the future of the law of contract – for a highly critical analysis of recent 
developments in common-law jurisdictions see N Andrews “Breach of Contract: A Plea for Clarity and 
Discipline” (2018) 134 LQR 117.
146 2012 3 SA 531 (CC) paras 23-24 (see Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2011 5 SA 19 
(SCA)).
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Such an enquiry could also have considered what role good faith could play in 
this enquiry. But this was not to be. Ultimately, as the majority indicated, the 
question whether the landlord validly terminated the lease under the common 
law had to be left open,147 since the dispute was governed by statutory rental 
legislation, which allows for a statutory tribunal to determine whether the 
landlord engaged in an unfair practice by terminating the lease. It is not 
without significance, however, that the majority indicated that in making such 
a determination, the tribunal would consider the parties’ respective interests, 
thereby underlining how important this consideration is in exercising these 
discretions.148 
A similar approach was adopted in the Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings case; 
here a tenant failed to pay rental on time due to its bank not properly processing 
a valid instruction to pay the landlord. The tenant remedied the breach shortly 
thereafter, but the landlord nonetheless elected to cancel the lease, which the 
tenant challenged on various grounds, including that the termination clause 
required parties to act in good faith, and could not be relied on when non-
payment was beyond the tenant’s control.149 In the court a quo, Van Oosten J, 
in a judgment influenced by that of Davis J in Combined Developers,150 held 
that the landlord did not validly exercise a right to terminate. The SCA in turn 
disagreed. Let us consider the reasoning more closely. 
In denying enforcement, the court a quo placed especially strong emphasis 
on the relevance of constitutional values such as ubuntu, which carries in it 
“ideas of humaneness, social justice and fairness”.151 But this is precisely the 
type of language that does not carry the day in the SCA. It would perhaps have 
been beneficial had the court a quo more specifically and expressly based its 
finding on the specific rules that express these values, which must include 
good faith, apart from ubuntu. More specifically, it would have been valuable 
had the court a quo enquired into how to apply the rule that enforcement may 
be refused on grounds of public policy, and what role the relative interests of 
the parties could play in making such a determination.152 
In this regard the following considerations may be relevant. In contrast 
to cases like Brisley v Drotsky, where the tenant was a serial defaulter, or 
Maphango, where the landlord needed to keep the property viable, it is not 
at all apparent what Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings’ interests in termination 
were; there was one prior late payment (ascribed to the tenant’s bank) and both 
late payments were soon remedied. To the tenant, in turn, termination meant 
the “death-knell” of its hotel business.153 This is not to say that weighing up 
interests is decisive; other factors may also be taken into account, and it is 




Mohamed‘s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 2017 4 SA 243 (GJ) para 
23.
151 2017 4 SA 243 (GJ) para 26.
152 Para 31. Cf Louw v Davids [2018] ZASCA 70 (29 May 2018) para 24 on the court exercising value 
judgement, which requires taking into account the parties’ interests in deciding whether breach warrants 
cancellation.
153 2017 4 SA 243 (GJ) para 31.
GIVING PRACTICAL EFFECT TO GOOD FAITH 405
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
legitimate to enquire what reasonable steps could be expected from a party 
to meet its obligations. Thus, in Barkhuizen,154 it rightly can be questioned 
whether it was practical to expect of the insured to institute action in 90 days. 
And in the Mohamed’s Leisure case it may in turn be questioned what more 
could reasonably have been expected from a debtor who had instructed its 
bank to pay, and was assured by a statement from the bank that payment was 
effected.155 
5 2 2  Exercising a right when there is a duty of immediate restitution
156
5 2 2 1 German law 
The next example is self-evidently a case of conduct that could be regarded 
as abusively exercising a right through failing to serve a proper purpose or 
protectable interest:157 it is impermissible to claim something for one reason, 
if that same thing in any event has to be returned for another reason. The idea 
has an ancient lineage and is expressed in the civil-law maxim dolo agit, qui 
petit, quod statim redditurus est.158 In essence, the interests of the defendant 
weigh stronger than those of the plaintiff. It is not apparent why the claim 
should be enforced, resulting in the risk of loss or disposal of the object or 
insolvency of the plaintiff, if the very thing has to be returned. The argument 
to some extent resembles the justifications for allowing set-off.159 Thus, a 
tenant who has a statutory claim for reduced rental cannot enforce it to the 
extent that the landlord in turn enjoys a claim for damages.160
5 2 2 2 South African perspective 
The dolo agit rule is also recognised in South African law. Thus, in Gerber 
v Wolson,
161 (decided before Bank of Lisbon confirmed the demise of the 
exceptio doli),162 Van den Heever JA stated that the dolo agit rule would have 
thwarted claims by co-sureties who sought recourse of amounts which they 
would in turn be obliged to repay. In this regard he expressly referred to the 
exceptio doli being available, a clear indication that this instrument served to 
give effect to a rule which was rooted in bona fides or good faith.
154 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC).
155 See 2017 4 SA 243 (GJ) para 12 and the submissions relating to possibility of performance by the tenant 
in Mohamed‘s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 2018 2 SA 314 (SCA) 
paras 13-15. The stance of the SCA that “... the respondent could have diarised well ahead of time to 
monitor this important monthly payment and it could have effected other means of payment such as an 
electronic funds transfer” (para 28), with respect, is not particularly convincing. Ultimately, the question 
whether absence of fault excuses breach of contract is a matter for the development of the substantive 
law of breach of contract. The public policy rule (like the good faith clause of § 242 BGB), may be only a 
temporary means to ensure that the demands of good faith are met.
156 
Pflicht zur alsbaldigen Rückgewähr - see Jauernig § 242 para 39; Palandt § 242 para 52; Münchener 
Kommentar § 242 paras 440-445; Staudinger § 242 paras 279-283.
157 Some commentaries bring this example home under the category of enforcing a right without any 
protectable interest (see 5 2 1 above, Palandt § 242 paras 50-52).
158 See D 50 17 173 3; D 44 4 8 pr.
159 
Staudinger § 242 para 281; Münchener Kommentar § 242 para 440.
160 See BGH 66, 302 305.
161 1955 1 SA 158 (A) 171. Also see Ntai v Vereeniging Town Council 1953 4 SA 579 (A) 588H.
162 
Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A).
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5 3 Engaging in prior objectionable conduct
5 3 1 Introduction 
The focus thus far was on how parties may not exercise existing rights in 
an abusive manner, and thereby violate good faith – whether directly, as in 
German law, through contravening the good faith clause, or indirectly, as in 
South African law, when falling foul of various common-law instruments that 
serve good faith as underlying value. Historically, these cases, as we have 
seen, are the domain of the exceptio doli praesentis or exceptio doli generalis 
– what South African law usually simply refers to as the exceptio doli. 
However, a party would also act improperly when seeking to exercise a right 
that arises from that person’s own prior objectionable or improper conduct 
(as opposed to having the present ulterior purpose or insufficient interests 
in seeking enforcement discussed above).163 In the earlier civil law, the 
mechanism that gave effect to this principle was the exceptio doli praeteriti 
or exceptio doli specialis, that is, the defence based on ‘initial’ or preceding 
dishonesty (dolus).164 
German law nowadays also applies the good faith clause to these cases, 
albeit that it does not actually require dishonest or deceitful behaviour; it 
suffices if a person acted objectionably by violating some or other duty.165 
The good faith clause also need not be applied where objectionable conduct 
rendered a contract illegal,166 or amounted to an improper form of obtaining 
consent, such as fraud or duress, inasmuch as these situations are already 
covered elsewhere in the code.167 
The same would be true for South African law; it could be regarded as 
contrary to good faith to obtain a contractual right through improper conduct, 
such as concluding a contract with an illegal purpose or engaging in fraud, 
duress or undue influence, which are established grounds for relief.168 So what 
constitutes the type of “objectionable” prior conduct that German law uses 
the good faith clause for to disqualify a party from exercising a right? From 
an outsider’s perspective, it is rather challenging to engage with this category. 
What, after all, could “objectionable” mean? But again, the devil is in the 
detail. The following are (admittedly rather abstract and fluid) sub-categories 
of such objectionable conduct. The first focuses on dishonourably benefitting 
one’s own position, and the second on subverting the other party’s position.
163 See generally Jauernig § 242 para 44; Staudinger § 242 paras 234-254; Münchener Kommentar § 242 
paras 250-255.
164 See Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 594 E-F.
165 In line with the terminology of earlier civil law, the subject matter is sometimes dealt with under the 
heading Unredliches früheres Verhalten, which means dishonest prior conduct (see Jauernig § 242 paras 
44-47). But, in line with the notion that fraud or dishonesty is not actually required, some commentaries 
merely refer to objectionable prior conduct or missbilligtes früheres Verhalten (see Münchener 
Kommentar § 242 paras 250 sqq). 
166 See the text to part 2 2 5 above on § 134 and § 138 I BGB.
167 See the text to part 2 2 3 above on § 123 BGB; Münchener Kommentar § 242 para 253.
168 See the text to parts 2 2 5, 5 2 1 2 (e) above on the rule that the terms must not per se be contrary to public 
policy; if this is the case, there can be no further enquiry into whether enforcement is contrary to public 
policy (see Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC)). Further see the text to part 2 2 3 above on defects 
of consent, such as undue influence. 
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5 3 2  Dishonourably acquiring rights or improving one’s own legal 
position
169
5 3 2 1 German law
This category covers a variety of cases where the good faith clause is 
invoked to prevent a party from exercising a contractual right due to prior 
dishonourable conduct. Sometimes the boundaries with the provisions of 
the code dealing with illegal and fraudulent conduct are rather indistinct, 
which makes it difficult to delineate its field of application. Possible examples 
include concluding and seeking to enforce agreements that would cause the 
party who has to perform to commit breach of a contract, or inducing a party 
to conclude an agreement that imposed obligations that such a party would 
clearly be unable to fulfil.170 It may also be contrary to good faith to enforce 
a clause after knowing full well that the other party made a calculation error 
when assenting to it;171 the dishonourable way in which the party seeking 
enforcement acted is regarded as a violation of good faith and justification for 
depriving him of a claim. 
5 3 2 2 South African perspective 
In South African law, some support exists for the notion that a court should 
not provide relief to a person with “unclean hands”. However, it is applied 
rather strictly in certain areas of law,172 and there is no indication that it 
functions to prevent a party from enforcing a contractual right that arises 
from such a party’s prior dishonourable conduct. In the contractual context, 
the defendant would have to rely on specific rules of the law of contract, for 
example that the courts will not enforce a contract which is concluded with 
an illegal or immoral purpose,173 or due to fraud or other recognised defects 
of consent.174 Some of the examples from German law referred to above could 
perhaps fall under these rules. For example, deliberately refraining from 
pointing out another party’s calculation mistake could, on a very generous 
interpretation of the duty to speak, amount to an actionable misrepresentation. 
But it is less apparent to what extent the other examples would qualify as 
actionable prior conduct under our law.
169 
Unredlicher Erwerb der eigenen Rechtsposition - see Staudinger § 242 para 237-244; Unredlicher 
Erwerb von Rechten und unredliche Schaffung von Rechtsstellungen - see Jauernig § 242 para 45; further 
see Palandt § 242 para 43-45; Münchener Kommentar § 242 paras 253-289.
170 See Münchener Kommentar § 242 paras 254-257. See 2 2 3 above on the closely related cases where 
advantage is taken of weakness (eg of poverty), but § 138 I BGB is applied.
171 
Palandt § 242 para 44.
172 See eg Mgoqi v City of Cape Town 2006 4 SA 355 (C) para 140, indicating the relevance of “unclean 
hands” in the context of unlawful competition, and Cambridge Plan AG v Moore 1987 4 SA 821 (D) 842 
in the context of trade mark law. Also see Mostert v Nash [2018] ZASCA 62 paras 24 sqq. Reference to the 
related civil law maxims that “no action can rise from bad faith” (ex dolo malo non oritur actio) and that 
“no one is heeded who adduces his own infamy” (turpitudinem suam allegans non auditur) are rare – see 
eg Phillips v Botha 1999 2 SA 555 (SCA) 567A.
173 See eg S v Marais 1982 3 SA 988 (A) 102-1003; the “unclean hands” argument could also justify barring 
restitution by way of the par delictum rule.
174 See the text to part 2 2 3 above. 
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5 3 3 Subverting the other party’s rights or legal position
175
 
5 3 3 1 German law
A further form of engaging in prior objectionable conduct consists in 
undermining or subverting another party’s rights or favourable legal position, 
or preventing such a legal position from arising in future. The relief consists 
of deeming the conduct not to have taken place and letting the favourable 
legal position prevail. A simple example illustrating the operation of good 
faith in this context is that of a person preventing notification. Depending on 
the circumstances, the notice may be deemed to have reached him, due to the 
objectionable manner in which it was sought to prevent the other party from 
exercising the right to give notice.176 A party who prevented compliance with 
formalities could also be prevented from subsequently relying on the formal 
defect.177 Although the issue is disputed, since formal requirements deserve to 
be taken seriously, there is some support for regarding it as contrary to good 
faith for a party to complain about the other party’s failure to notify or meet 
formal requirements when the complaining party was actually responsible 
for it. 
5 3 3 2  South African perspective 
The fact pattern of what steps amount to proper notice, and what can be 
expected of the addressee has enjoyed considerable attention in South African 
courts.178 In Kubyana v Standard Bank of SA Ltd179 the Constitutional Court 
held that a duty exists on an addressee of a notice to act reasonably, and that 
this duty is violated when he deliberately prevents delivery; notification can 
then be deemed to have been effected. However, the court did not expressly 
indicate that the party preventing notice acted contrary to good faith.180 
As far as the example of failure to comply with formalities is concerned, 
South African law would not expect a party to co-operate to put a contract in 
writing merely because this was a self-imposed requirement, whether for the 
initial validity or variation of a written contract. But First National Bank Ltd 
v Avtjoglou provides some support for the notion that a party who prevents 
compliance by deliberately retaining a copy signed by himself, in order to 
prevent the other party from signing the copy as well, would not be able to 
rely on non-compliance with formalities. In this regard the court expressly 
175 
Vereitelung von Rechten der Gegenpartei und ihr günstigen Rechtslagen - see Jauernig § 242 para 46; 
Unredliche Vereitelung der gegnerischen Rechtsposition (Staudinger § 242 para 245-249; Münchener 
Kommentar § 242 paras 302-308.
176 BGH 137, 209 sqq; Jauernig § 242 para 46; Münchener Kommentar § 242 para 303.
177 RG 96, 315; Jauernig § 242 para 46. Further see Staudinger § 242 para 246 on Rechtsformmisbrauch and 
§ 242 para 445-452 on the role of good faith in the context of compliance with formal requirements in the 
context of § 125 BGB.
178 See J du Plessis “Rethinking Notification in the Law of Contract” (2017) 80 THRHR 113.
179 2014 3 SA 56 (CC).
180 German experiences suggest that the court could have justified its position by arguing that good faith is 
violated when another’s favourable legal position is subverted or prevented. This sounds somewhat more 
plausible than arguing that a debtor preventing notice violates good faith by engaging in contradictory 
behaviour (see Du Plessis (2017) THRHR 113 for criticism of this explanation; further see 5 4 below). 
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referred to “the equitable rule that a party cannot take advantage of his own 
default to the loss or injury of another”.181
5 3 4  Failure as creditor to be true to the contract: the “you too” 
defence and reciprocity
182
5 3 4 1 German law
One of the oldest defences against being criticised for acting in a certain 
way is to accuse the accuser of engaging in similar conduct. This is called the 
“you too” (tu quoque) defence. It is doubtful whether German law recognises 
a general principle to the effect that only a party who is “true” or “faithful” to 
the contract may exercise rights under it. However, expression could be given 
to the underlying sentiment in a variety of ways. Sometimes specific clauses 
of the German Civil Code are invoked, for example those on when one party 
may refuse to perform until the other party renders counter-performance (the 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus).183 But sometimes good faith can be the 
basis for barring the “untrue” party from exercising a right. Thus a landlord 
who is contractually obliged to agree to a request by the tenant to sublet, but 
fails to do so, may not subsequently terminate the lease if the tenant sublets 
without the landlord’s permission.184 And a creditor seeking recourse from a 
surety may be deprived of a claim if the surety’s interests were grossly violated 
by, for example, causing the main debtor to commit breach or prejudicing the 
surety’s right of recourse.185
5 3 3 2 South African perspective 
South African law also knows no general rule that a party may only exercise 
rights under a contract if he is true or faithful to it. But, as in German law, 
it has certain rules that give effect to this basic notion. Parties to reciprocal 
contracts must respect each other’s right to performance, which means that a 
party who claims performance may be defeated by the exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus if he in turn does not perform or tender performance. In Botha v 
Rich NO,186 the Constitutional Court expressly recognised that the principle of 
reciprocity and the exceptio give expression to good faith, thus indicating how 
this underlying value is served by specific rules.187 
181 2000 1 SA 989 (C) 996. The court regarded the contract as “conditional” on being signed, and held that 
the doctrine of fictional fulfilment consequently applied, which resulted in the “condition” being deemed 
to have been fulfilled – for comment see Van Huyssteen et al Contract 147 fn 9. Further see Du Plessis 
NO v Goldco Motor & Cycle Supplies (Pty) Ltd 2009 6 SA 617 (SCA). See Van Huyssteen et al Contract 
283 on the doctrine of fictional fulfilment of a condition when a party was under a duty not to interfere 
with fulfilment as an emanation of good faith. On the equivalent doctrine in German law (§ 162 BGB) and 
its link to the notion that a party should not reap benefits obtained contrary to a duty to act in accordance 
with good faith, see Palandt § 162 para 4, read with § 242 para 42, 46; Jauernig § 162 para 2.
182 
Eigene Vertragsuntreue des Gläubigers – see Jauernig § 242 para 47.
183 The right of withholding performance is contained in § 273 BGB and the exceptio in § 320 BGB.
184 
Jauernig § 242 para 47.
185 See Jauernig § 242 para 47cc; Münchener Kommentar § 242 para 298 on Verwirkung (on Verwirkung by 
time see the text to part 5 4 2 below).
186 2014 4 SA 124 (CC).
187 Para 45.
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As far as the example of prior conduct of the creditor to the prejudice of 
the surety is concerned, South African law would only release the surety if 
the creditor is in breach of a specific duty;188 the courts have emphatically 
rejected the notion that there is some general “prejudice principle” whereby 
a surety could be released when suffering a “real and substantial prejudice 
which has the effect of unduly increasing the contractual burden of the surety 
with reference to all the relevant facts and circumstances, and with due regard 
to considerations of justice, fairness, reasonableness, good faith and public 
policy”.189 If this example is anything to go by, the courts will not easily be 
swayed by a “you too” argument that is not strongly rooted in the existing 
rules. 
5 4  Engaging in contradictory conduct
190
5 4 1  Introduction
Our final main example of behaviour that is so improper that it violates 
the good faith clause involves engaging in contradictory conduct, or “going 
against what one has done earlier” (venire contra factum proprium) according 
to the civilian tradition. Generally, the party engaging in the contradictory 
behaviour is prevented from getting away with it, since he created a protectable 
reliance on the side of the other party.191 
5 4 2  German law
Commentaries on the German Civil Code sub-divide cases of contradictory 
conduct in a number of categories, but at times it does seem as if classificatory 
order is pursued at the expense of utility. The focus will accordingly only be 
on some general examples that convey the essence of this form of improper 
behaviour that violates good faith and will thereafter shift to the prominent 
case of forfeiture of a right (Verwirkung). 
As far as the general examples are concerned, the good faith clause could 
be applied against a party who created a reliance that he would exercise a 
right in a certain way or not exercise it at all, only to turn around and do 
the opposite.192 A party might, for example, create the impression that he is 
interested in obtaining performance of a contract, only to cancel it due to 
breach,193 or create the impression that he acts as independent contractor, 
188 See ABSA Bank Ltd v Davidson 2000 1 SA 1117 (SCA); Bock v Duburoro Investments (Pty) Ltd 2004 2 SA 
242 (SCA); Fedbond Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Meier 2008 1 SA 458 (C) 466. Also see Nedbank Ltd v Zevoli 
208 (Pty) Ltd 2017 6 SA 318 (KZP) paras 32, 41.
189 
Di Giulio v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd 2002 6 SA 281 (C) para 41.
190 
Widersprüchliches Verhalten - see Jauernig § 242 paras 48-52; Staudinger § 242 para 284-318; Palandt § 
242 paras 55-59; Münchener Kommentar § 242 paras 344-355. 
191 See Münchener Kommentar § 242 paras 344-355; Palandt § 242 para 59 on the (relatively) rare instances 
where a party is held liable for contradictory behaviour even though such a reliance is absent, or not 
particularly prominent. 
192 
Widerspruch zu begründetem Vertrauenstatbestand – see Jauernig § 242 para 50; Münchener Kommentar 
§ 242 paras 341-343.
193 See BGH WM 06, 1534; Jauernig § 242 para 50.
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only to maintain subsequently that he was appointed as employee.194 A party 
may further also not raise the defence of prescription or failure to adhere to a 
time limit in an improper manner; this does not only include the more serious 
case of intentionally deterring the creditor from taking legal action, but also 
unintentional behaviour that causes the claim not to be pursued timeously.195 
One example of contradictory behaviour is regarded as such a prominent 
application of the good faith clause that some commentaries deal with it 
separately from the more general cases considered above.196 It concerns the 
situation where a party has not exercised a right for an extended period of 
time, and then unexpectedly does so, thereby acting contrary to a reliance 
created on the side of the other party that the right will not be exercised. 
To protect the latter party’s reliance, the law may respond by declaring 
forfeiture (Verwirkung) of the right. For example, a landlord could acquire the 
right to terminate a lease when a tenant commits breach by being a drunken 
nuisance, but if the landlord only exercises this right a year later, after creating 
the impression that he has abandoned the right, it may be forfeited.197 The 
situations of forfeiture under consideration here differ from those where a 
right is waived by express or tacit agreement.198 Waiver could for example be 
inferred if a landlord unreservedly accepts and provides a receipt for a lesser 
amount than the actual amount of rental due.199
5 4 3  South African perspective 
A number of constructs in South African law could serve the purpose of 
protecting a party against contradictory behaviour. The most prominent of 
these is undoubtedly estoppel, which serves the general function of preventing 
persons from acting contrary to their representations.200 It is well-established 
that estoppel gives expression to the demands of good faith, and could be 
linked to the exceptio doli,201 albeit that estoppel’s specific requirements 
narrowly delineate its contours. For example, to take the lead from the 
termination example above, a landlord could in principle be estopped from 
exercising a cancellation clause if he created an impression that contributed 
to a tenant committing breach. But in applying this principle the courts have 
194 
Unlösbarer Selbstwiderspruch - see Jauerning para 49.
195 
Missbräuchliche Geltendmachung der Verjährungseinrede – see Jauernig § 242 para 51. This category 
also includes the related situation where one party deters another from adhering to a time limit within 
which to exercise a right (for example to pursue a claim for compensation), and then subsequently relies on 
the time limit having expired (missbräuchliche Berufung auf den Ablauf von Ausschlussfristen; see BGH 
NJW-RR 87, 157; Jauernig § 242 para 52). 
196 See Palandt § 242 paras 87-107; Jauernig § 242 paras 53-63; Staudinger § 242 para 300-316; Münchener 
Kommentar § 242 paras 290-301, 356-421.
197 H Brox & W Walker Allgemeiner Teil des BGB 41 ed (2017) para 691; further see Staudinger § 242 para 
784-785 on claims for payment by landlords and claims for repayment by tenants. 
198 
Verzicht, which is linked to Erlass (see § 397 BGB); Palandt § 242 para 91.
199 
Palandt § 242 para 91.
200 See J Sonnekus The Law of Estoppel in South Africa 3 ed (2012).
201 See Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in Southern Cross 221-227 on the reception of estoppel by 
linking it to the exceptio doli and hence to good faith; Sonnekus The Law of Estoppel 3-4.
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strictly interpreted the requirements of estoppel.202 This approach also renders 
it uncertain whether estoppel could be relied on to reach similar outcomes 
as in earlier cases that used the exceptio doli to protect a purchaser who was 
“lulled into a false sense of security” that payment could be made after the 
due date.203 
Further constructs that could protect reliance include ostensible authority, 
which is applied in the law of representation or agency,204 while the quasi 
mutual assent and iustus error doctrines could protect the reliance of one 
party on the existence of the contract which the other now seeks to deny.205 
However, there will be cases where a party relies on behaviour which is 
contradicted, but none of these instruments provide relief; here the parties 
would not be able to resort directly to good faith. A particularly prominent 
example concerns non-variation clauses: a party cannot escape from such a 
clause by arguing that the other party agreed to an oral variation and is now 
acting in a contradictory manner (and contrary to good faith) by requiring 
compliance with the writing requirement.206 To escape, a party would have 
to rely on recognised exceptions. These include the prohibition against 
approbating and reprobating by first relying on a variation that does not comply 
(for example, by pleading it), only subsequently to allege non-compliance. 207
As far as the fact pattern of seeking to exercise a right after an extended 
period of time is concerned, a right does not automatically terminate merely 
because an “unreasonable” period has passed.208 To defeat an attempt at 
enforcement a party would have to rely on specific mechanisms. He could 
argue that the right has been waived,209 but this can only be inferred from 
unequivocal conduct creating the impression of an intention to waive.210 But 
again estoppel can be an avenue of relief,211 the argument being that a party 
 
 
202 See Die Afrikaanse Pers Bpk v Perestrello 1949 2 SA 346 (W) 348 (a tenant argued that the landlord 
should have informed him that a cheque delivered in payment of rental was dishonoured, but it was held 
that the landlord did not directly contribute to the tenant’s mistaken impression; further see Lovemore 
v White 1978 3 SA 254 (E) 259-260; Palace Shareblock Ltd v Lavender Moon Trading 157 CC t/a the 
Copper Chimney [2009] ZAKZDHC 41 paras 17-20 and Venter v Venter 1948 1 SA 1291 (C), where 
the landlord was also not found to have made a representation by failing to inform the tenant of the 
default. On the alternative argument that a right is exercised improperly and contrary to good faith due to 
insufficient interest see 5 2 1 above). 
203 See Edwards v Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1983 1 SA 617 (W) 627-628. Also 
see Senekal v Home Sites (Pty) Ltd 1950 1 SA 139 (W) (a purchaser knew that a third party had prior rights 
to a property, yet demanded transfer of a clean title; this claim was defeated by the exceptio doli).
204 On the contested relationship between estoppel and ostensible authority see Makate v Vodacom 2016 4 SA 
121 (CC). 
205 See the text to part 2 2 3 above.
206 See Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 11-34, overruling Miller NNO v Dannecker 2001 1 SA 928 
(C).
207 See Telcordia Technologies Inc v Telkom SA Ltd 2007 3 SA 266 (SCA) para 12; Klub Lekkerrus/Libertas 
v Troye Villa (Pty) Ltd [2011] 3 All SA 597 (SCA) para 26; Yarram Trading CC t/a Tijuana Spur v Absa 
Bank Ltd 2007 2 SA 570 (SCA) paras 26-28.
208 
Mahabeer v Sharma NNO 1985 3 SA 729 (A) 736-737.
209 736G, where waiver was regarded as synonymous with electing not to exercise a right.
210 See Road Accident Fund v Mothupi 2000 4 SA 38 (A) para 19; Mahabeer v Sharma NNO 1985 3 SA 729 
(A) 736J-737D. 
211 
Mahabeer v Sharma NNO 1985 3 SA 729 (A) 737H-738C.
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who does not exercise a right over an extended period of time could (culpably) 
create the impression that it would no longer be pursued. Again, as with 
Verwirkung, one is dealing with an instrument that promotes good faith by 
counteracting contradictory behaviour. 
Finally, some support further exists for recognising the defence of 
“acquiescence”.212 In this regard early case law supports “the equitable 
principle that if a person lies by with a full knowledge of his rights and of 
the infringement of those rights, he is precluded from asserting them”. This 
is said to “form a branch of the law of dolus malus”.213 It remains to be seen, 
however, whether this approach is good law.214 The use of the expression “lies 
by” in early case law clearly relates to the English doctrine of laches, which 
has been decisively rejected in South African law in Zuurbekom Ltd v Union 
Corporation Ltd (“Zuurbekom”),215 and some English authority apparently 
regard this doctrine as in any event overlapping with estoppel.216 Nonetheless, 
it is possible that acquiescence could cover a niche of cases of contradictory 
behaviour that do not fall within the ambit of estoppel and waiver (and perhaps 
would cover some of those covered by Verwirkung). In the Zuurbekom case, 
the court left the door open for recognition of these cases by stating that they 
could be covered by the exceptio doli. However, this door was of course closed 
when the exceptio doli was later regarded as not being part of our law.217 
Nonetheless, if our courts regard these cases as deserving of protection, 
good faith could still fulfil the function of an underlying value that supports 
recognising acquiescence as a part of our law. It would certainly not be the 
first time that English imports have been baptised in the water of good faith; 
in fact, this is exactly what happened with estoppel.218
6  The correcting or controlling function of good faith 
6 1  Introduction
We now turn to the third and final function of the good faith clause. It used 
to be one of its most dramatic and far-reaching applications and may explain 
why South African courts have been so wary to accord good faith any greater 
status than that of underlying value. We are dealing here with its function of 
 
 
212 See eg Botha v White 2004 3 SA 184 (T) para 31. Reference is made to the judgment of Jansen J in North 
Vaal Mineral Co Ltd v Lovasz 1961 3 604 (T) 608B-H, which contains only general comments on the 
application of the exceptio doli in cases not amounting to estoppel.
213 
Policansky Bros v Hermann & Canard 1910 TPD 1265 1278.
214 It was doubted but left open in New Media Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Eating Out Web Services CC 2005 5 SA 
388 (C) 406-408.
215 
Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation Ltd 1947 1 SA 514 (A) 534-535.
216 See the reference to English authority in Resisto Dairy (Pty) Ltd v Auto Protection Insurances Co Ltd 
1963 1 SA 632 (A) 643A-B. In the South African context further see Garlick Ltd v Phillips 1949 1 SA 121 
(A) 129; Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in Southern Cross 242.
217 See Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation Ltd 1947 1 SA 514 (A) 537; Zimmermann “Good Faith and 
Equity” in Southern Cross 233.
218 See Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in Southern Cross 221-227 on resorting to the exceptio doli 
to legitimise the reception of estoppel.
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“correcting” or “controlling” the substance of a contract.219 This function has 
been especially relevant in two contexts, namely when there was a drastic 
change of circumstances, or serious unfairness of the terms. Nowadays the 
German Civil Code contains specific provisions to deal with these situations, 
but some commentaries still find it useful to refer to residual cases where the 
good faith clause in some way could play the role of “correcting” the contract. 
6 2  Change of circumstances and hardship 
6 2 1  German law 
Parties to a contract may have various expectations, of which some may be 
achieved and others not. A basic point of departure in German law, as indeed 
in South African law, is that these are the risks that the parties must bear. 
Nonetheless, sometimes the circumstances that prevail when the contract 
ultimately has to be performed could differ so radically and unexpectedly 
from those that existed at its conclusion that this general approach requires 
reconsideration. 
This was for example the case when hyperinflation struck in Germany 
in the 1920s. Judges rather boldly, given the resolve of the legislature not to 
intervene, relied on the good faith clause to prevent debtors from effectively 
escaping liability by paying the nominal value of debts that had become 
worthless due to hyperinflation.220 In due course, however, the rules relating 
to these cases evolved and assumed such an independent character that they 
came to be located in their own special provision in the civil code, § 313 
BGB, albeit that some overlap with § 242 BGB is still possible.221 In essence, 
§ 313 BGB enables adapting, and, if this is not feasible, even terminating a 
contract if the circumstances that became the “basis” of the contract changed 
significantly since the contract was entered into, and if the parties would not 
have entered into the contract, or they would have entered into it with different 
contents if they had foreseen this change. These experiences illustrate how 
general clauses can be victims of their own success; or, to put it more positively, 
how they can give birth to new sets of rules.
6 2 2  South African perspective 
South African law is traditionally not favourably disposed to releasing a 
party from liability due to change of circumstances.222 The common law of 
supervening impossibility of performance only releases a party if no-one 
could render the desired performance any more (that is, if there is objective 
219 See Jauernig § 242 para 8. But see the general remark at the beginning of 3 above that these broad 
headings are somewhat imprecise, inasmuch as it can be argued that a “correcting” function is (also) 
exercised by imposing supplementary duties, or by limiting parties’ rights.
220 See generally Ebke & Steinhauer “The Doctrine of Good Faith in German Contract Law” in Good Faith 
and Fault in Contract Law 171 180-189.
221 See Staudinger § 242 paras 385-386. The good faith clause might still be relevant if a party does not want 
terms to be adapted, and only seeks to prevent the improper application of a term.
222 See Van Huyssteen et al Contract 517-524. The courts may, however, take into account problems of 
hardship to the debtor when exercising the discretion to award specific performance (see the text to part 
5 2 1 2 above; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 523).
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impossibility), as opposed to cases, such as the hyperinflation example above, 
where the particular debtor cannot perform, or would find it hard or difficult 
to do so (that is, cases of subjective impossibility).223 
It has been argued, though, that in this regard South African law is out of touch 
with international developments and that it needs to be more accommodating 
to hardship cases, and distribute risks more equitably between the parties, 
who cannot always be expected to do so contractually in advance.224 Whether 
such a change in our common law of contract, and more specifically the rules 
on supervening impossibility,225 ultimately is desirable of course requires 
weighing up various values, but the German experience clearly shows that the 
requirements of good faith could play a central role in this context, given their 
emphasis on concern for the contracting party. In this regard our courts have 
at times at least indicated that pacta servanda cannot be a trump card that 
defeats any attempt to deal with changed circumstances.226
6 3  Unfair contract terms 
6 3 1  German law 
To a limited extent, German law allows courts to provide relief where the 
substance or content of contractual terms is unfair. Earlier on, this was done 
(admittedly in more extreme cases) by relying on the good faith clause227 or 
by applying § 138 BGB. However, in due course legislation was introduced 
specifically to combat unfair standard terms, and finally this type of protection 
was incorporated into separate provisions of the German Civil Code.228 The 
adoption of the latter provisions has diminished the relevance of the good faith 
clause in the context of combatting unfair terms, but it still fulfils a residual 
controlling function, for example when some agreements are individually 
negotiated.229
6 3 2  South African perspective 
South African law has no tradition of directly relying on good faith to 
exercise control over the content of contractual terms. Even when good faith 
223 There is support for the notion that objective impossibility cannot be equated to actual factual impossibility, 
and could cover cases where performance is physically possible, but prohibitively expensive (see Van 
Huyssteen et al Contract 518). But this is not subjective hardship. 
224 See eg Hutchison (2010) Stell LR 414.
225 Theoretically, there may also be other avenues of common-law relief. This includes reading in an implied 
term that a contract needs to be adjusted if circumstances change (a clausula rebus sic stantibus). See 
eg Van Schalkwyk v Van Schalkwyk 1947 4 SA 86 (O) for a rare and unsuccessful invocation of a “tacit 
condition rebus sic stantibus”. Neels has argued that the law should not hide behind such a fiction, 
albeit that he accepts that implied terms could be read into contracts to give effect to the supplementary 
operation of fairness and reasonableness (Thesis 81-83).
226 See Linvestment CC v Hammersley 2008 3 SA 283 (SCA) paras 31-32, which dealt with the effect of 
changed circumstances on servitudes.
227 
Münchener Kommentar § 242 para 139. 
228 §§ 307 sqq BGB. See T Naude “Factors Relevant to the Assessment of the Unfairness or Unreasonableness 
of Contract Terms: Some Guidance from the German Law on Standard Contract Terms” (2015) Stell LR 
85 90.
229 
Münchener Kommentar § 242 para 139; Jauernig § 242 para 15; BGH 101, 353 sqq; Whittaker & 
Zimmermann “Good faith in European Contract Law” in Good Faith 28.
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was still given effect through the exceptio doli before the Bank of Lisbon 
decision of 1988, the courts did not use it to strike down terms merely 
because they were substantively unfair.230 It would indeed have been unusual, 
if not incongruous, to do so, while, for example, simultaneously rejecting 
the doctrine of laesio enormis, which was aimed at combatting substantive 
unfairness, and also could be regarded as giving expression to good faith.231 
However, our legal system at present is clearly not unconcerned with 
substantive unfairness. First, without having gone the German route of 
initially resorting to a statutory good faith clause, we have adopted consumer 
legislation which generally requires that the price and terms of a consumer 
contract must be fair,232 and specifically invalidates or presumes terms to 
be unfair.233 Secondly, in 1990, barely two years after the Bank of Lisbon 
decision, it was recognised in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes234 that a term could 
be so substantively unfair as to be contrary to public policy. Since our system 
also accepts that good faith as constitutional value could be taken into 
account when determining whether public policy should invalidate a term, 
good faith may indirectly assist in deciding whether contractual terms should 
be “corrected”.235 And, to complete the picture, we have seen that if this 
correction does not take place, and a term is per se valid, courts may still on 
grounds of public policy “limit” or refuse to enforce it; here good faith can as 
underlying value indirectly assist in this “limiting” function being fulfilled.236 
Ultimately, there can be considerable disagreement about where courts 
should draw the line in applying the public policy rule.237 But then the debate 
is not about whether we have a rule that can be used to combat and control 
substantively unfair terms. We have such a rule, namely the public policy rule; 
the question is how it should be applied.238
7  Conclusions
South African law has been struggling for some time to determine what 
place to accord good faith in the law of contract. The meaning of the concept 
is not self-evident, and the potential roles it could play vary considerably. 
But we are not unique in facing these challenges. We can obtain a better 
understanding of them by learning from systems that have grappled with them 
in the past. We are also in the fortunate position of being able to implement 
230 See Paddock Motors (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 1976 3 SA 16 (A) 28; Dithaba Platinum (Pty) Ltd v Erconovaal 
1985 4 SA 615 (T) 629. 
231 See J Gordley “Good Faith in the Medieval Ius Commune” in Good Faith in European Contract Law 93, 
100-102 on how good faith (through the law of dolus) could be the basis for substantive control in earlier 
civil law; Voet 18 5 14.
232 S 48 of the CPA.
233 See s 51 of the Consumer Protection Act, which “blacklists” certain terms, reg 44(3) (GN 293 in GG 34180 
of 1-4-2011), which “greylists” certain terms by presuming unfairness.
234 1989 1 SA 1 (A).
235 See the text to part 2 2 5 above.
236 See the text to part 5 2 1 2 (e) above.
237 Especially whether the interpretation in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 
(SCA) that a constitutional value must be “implicated” before public policy requires denying enforcement, 
is too strict.
238 See the minority judgment of Moseneke DCJ in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC).
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these lessons due to our uncodified system of private law which has never 
been afraid to seek inspiration from foreign law, and which is located in a 
constitutional dispensation that allows courts to transform the law to give 
effect to fundamental rights and values.
Taking the lead from some local commentators, it was enquired here whether 
South African law can benefit from the experiences of modern civilian systems 
in giving practical effect to the requirements of good faith. And in this regard 
it is quite clear that when facing this challenge, German law has regarded it 
as essential to adhere to a quite specific interpretation of the concept. Good 
faith is not equated with vague notions of fairness or reasonableness;239 it is 
an objective standard,240 requiring of the parties not to pursue self-interest 
boundlessly, but to respect and consider each other’s interests. This focussed 
meaning has also been advocated by local commentators,241 and can be linked 
to indigenous values that serve related purposes.242
However, the value of a comparative perspective is not limited to assisting 
in defining the concept of good faith. As Ngcobo J pointed out in Barkhuizen, 
in South African law “[n]o comprehensive analysis has yet appeared of how 
the principle of good faith operates and what its various functions are …”.243 
Such an analysis remains to be done, but it has been attempted here to at least 
contribute to this end by drawing on the experiences of a legal system with a 
shared heritage, and to relate these experiences to those of South African law. 
As we have seen, German law differentiates between three broad practical 
fields of application of the good faith clause. These are (i) its “supplementing” 
function of filling gaps in the contractual relationship by refining and adding to 
existing duties; (ii) its “limiting” function, which constrains a party seeking to 
enforce a contractual right, for example due to pursuit of interests not worthy 
of protection, or due to engaging in contradictory conduct; and, finally, (iii) 
its “correcting” function of changing contractual terms, for example due to 
changed circumstances or extreme unfairness.244 
A comparison of these experiences with those of South African law has 
revealed that our system recognises a variety of rules that fulfil functions 
comparable to those of the German good faith clause. These include rules on 
reading implied terms to “supplement” existing terms, on resorting to public 
policy or estoppel to “limit” the enforcement of valid terms, and on using 
239 The vehement reaction to the views of Olivier JA on the role of good faith could at least partly be ascribed 
to him not giving a more specific meaning to good faith (see the text to part 2 2 6 above). 
240 See the text to part 2 1 1 above on the fundamental distinction between the subjective meaning of good 
faith, which entails having a state of mind (as when a party acts “in good faith”) and its objective meaning 
of a value or standard.
241 See Lubbe (1990) Stell LR 7, 20, and reference there to Tjospomie Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Drakensberg 
Botteliers (Pty) Ltd 1989 4 SA 31 (T) 54-55, 58-59.
242 On the relevance of the customary notion of ubuntu and its relationship to good faith in the law of contract, 
see J du Plessis “Fairness and diversity in the South African law of contract” to appear in a forthcoming 
Festschrift for Esin Örücü; Neels Tussen Regmatigheid en Onregmatigheid 141.
243 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 80. Also see Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 71 
(per Olivier JA) (“The operation of good faith in our law of contract is still far from being explored and 
given content. This will have to happen over the years and on the basis of many judgments. Ultimately, a 
new framework and mindset will hopeful arise …”).
244 For early recognition of these categories in South African context see the pioneering comments by Carey 
Miller (1980) 87 SALJ 531 535-537.
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public policy to “correct” a contract that is substantively unfair. It was further 
shown that the German code contains other provisions, apart from the good 
faith clause, that could be regarded as promoting good faith as value; again, it 
was apparent that certain rules of South African law fulfil similar functions.
Against the backdrop of these comparative observations, let us finally 
return to the question posed in the introduction. Assuming that there is a 
need to promote greater fairness in the South African law of contract, do the 
experiences of systems like German law show that we could benefit from 
elevating good faith from an underlying, constitutionally-recognised value to 
a rule, comparable to the good faith clause? It is readily admitted that only 
a limited number of examples were considered here, so any conclusion can 
only be provisional, but it is difficult to avoid the strong impression that many 
functions of the German good faith clause are already fulfilled, or could be 
fulfilled by existing rules of South African law. This suggests that adopting a 
good faith rule would be a conquest of much less territory than its protagonists 
may expect. Furthermore, it also seems inevitable that such a step could give 
rise to new conflicts, arising from uncertainty about overlaps between such a 
good faith rule and other rules, most notably the rule that neither the content 
nor the enforcement of contracts should be contrary to public policy. 
It may therefore well be that our attention should rather be focussed on how 
good faith could best be given effect to as fundamental value, which is the role 
our courts have thus far assigned it. Here the functions-based classification 
of German law could sharpen our focus and aid our courts to consider more 
precisely how specific rules could give expression to this value, and thereby 
contribute to a fairer and more just law of contract.
SUMMARY
South African courts generally support the notion that good faith is an underlying value of the law of 
contract, as opposed to a rule or standard that could be relied on directly to promote fairness. However, 
some commentators have criticised this approach and pointed out that the private law codes of modern 
civil-law systems contain general clauses or rules to the effect that parties must act according to good 
faith. The contribution focuses on arguably the most prominent of these codified systems, namely 
German law, and seeks to determine whether its experiences with the practical application of a good 
faith clause do indeed suggest that South African law will benefit from according a more prominent 
status to good faith. After examining how German law narrowly defines good faith, and how the good 
faith clause fits in the broader context of the Constitution and the German Civil Code, it is shown 
how the clause fulfils three main functions. These are to “supplement” contractual duties, to “limit” 
parties in the way they exercise contractual rights, and to “correct” or modify contractual terms. This 
threefold division of basic functions is adopted as a structure within which a broad range of rules of 
South African law can be located. This comparative analysis enables a clearer understanding of how 
these rules of South African law currently give practical effect to good faith as value, or have the 
potential to do so in future. The conclusion is reached that it is not self-evident that our courts must 
elevate good faith to a general standard or rule in order to promote greater contractual fairness.
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